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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Limitation of Liability-Vessel Cast Ashore
by Act of God
In the recent case of Wong v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.,' a federal
district court denied a petition for limitation of liability where a private
vessel had been cast by a tidal wave onto the plaintiff's property. The
defendant insurance company declared the boat a total loss, refused to
let the boat owner accept an offer he had for removal, took an assign-
ment of salvage rights, and thereafter made attempts to sell the hulk.
Upon defendant's refusal to remove the wreck, plaintiff landowner
brought an action for removal and for trespass damages resulting from
the failure to remove. Defendant's petition for limitation was denied
upon procedural grounds ;2 however, this Note will be limited to the
substantive issue of the right to limit liability where a vessel is cast
ashore by an Act of God.
Limitation of liability is a federally created right3 over which the
admiralty courts have exclusive jurisdiction.4  Basically, it enables a
shipowner to limit his liability to the value of his ship and pending
freight5 after the complained of incident,6 where, without privity or
knowledge7 of the owner, his vessel causes personal injury or property
damage to another. This limitation is permitted even though the ship-
owner may be fully indemnified through insurance for the loss of his
vessel.8 Although the original purpose of the limitation doctrine was to
foster the commerce and business of the sea,9 it is now settled that the
'167 F. Supp. 230 (D. Hawaii 1958).
2The defendant had failed to comply with Admiralty Rule 51, 28 U.S.C. §
2073 (1952) and 49 STAT. 1480 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1952), requiring the
petitioner to pay into court, or transfer to a trustee, the minimum value of his
interest in the vessel.
'REv. STAT. §§ 4283-89 (1875), 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-89 (1952).
'Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931); In re Great Lakes Transit Corp.,
63 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1933) ; The Aloha, 56 F.2d 647 (W.D. Wash. 1932).
' Pending freight refers to the earnings of the voyage. The Black Eagle, 87
F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1937).
City of Norwich v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886) ; The
C. F. Coughlin, 25 F. Supp. 649 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).
"The privity or knowledge that excludes the operation of this section must
be actual, in the sense of knowledge or authorization, or immediate control of the
wrongful acts or conditions, or through some kind of personal participation in
them." The Oneida, 282 Fed. 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1922). For a discussion of this
term and its applicability, see GiLMORE AND BLACK, ADMuIALTY §§ 10-20 to -26(1957).
8 City of Norwich v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886) ; The
Pere Marquette 18, 203 Fed. 127 (E.D. Wis. 1913).
o Moore v. American Transp. Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 1 (1861).
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privilege extends to the owners of pleasure yachts and other water
craft.10
The doctrine of limitation of liability is equally applicable whether
the damages are consummated on land'1 or on navigable waters, and
regardless of the location of the ship causing the damage.1 2 The courts
have reasoned that the exercise of the privilege is no longer dependent
on whether the tort is maritime or nonmaritime, but rather is a privilege
given to all shipowners ipso facto, and it is not required that the
plaintiff's cause of action be grounded in admiralty for the shipowner to
avail himself of this privilege.' 8
Since the privilege of limitation is available to all shipowners, there
would appear to be no question of its availability to a defendant whose
ship had been negligently navigated or cast upon a plaintiff's property
causing damages thereon. Defendant would, of course, be liable for the
trespass damage, but only to the extent of his limited liability so long as
the trespass was without privity or knowledge. However, once the
unabandoned vessel is on plaintiff's property and there has been an
unheeded demand for removal, defendant is precluded from limiting his
liability for damages occurring after the demand because the damages
are now caused with privity or knowledge of the owner.14
The preceding background has involved situations where there was
an existing liability on the boatowner, and the question was whether
this should have been a limited liability. Since it is generally accepted
that there is no liability for the Acts of God,15 and since the initial
damages in the principal case were caused by an Act of God, it is clear
that there was no liability on the boatowner for the original damage.
Thus the question presented by Wong is whether there is a liability
10 Petition of Liebler, 19 F. Supp. 829 (W.D.N.Y. 1937) ; 49 STAT. 1480 (1936),
46 U.S.C. § 188 (1953).
" Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911) (barge collided with the abutment
of a railroad drawbridge). The Irving F. Ross, 8 F.2d 313 (D. Mass. 1923)(ashes from a barge impaired the flow of a factory's drainage pipes).
12 In two relatively recent cases the vessels were in winter storage, on land,
and caused injuries when they exploded while agents of the owners were performing
maintenance on them. In the Matter of Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73(D. Conn. 1954) ; The Trim Too, 39 F. Supp. 271 (D. Mass. 1941).
i 3 BENEDICT, AmERICAN ADMIRALTY § 116 (6th ed. 1940).
"In re Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 640
(1931). In this case a barge which had negligently broken loose washed ashore
and was causing damage to a boardwalk. The barge owners, although still
claiming title, made no effort to remove the barge for four days after notice was
given to them, and the court held that they consequently had lost the right to
limit liability.
"In Louisville Ry. v. Sweeney, 157 Ky. 620, 163 S.W. 739 (1914), it was
said that one who trespasses upon another and inflicts an injury is liable for the
injury unless caused by the Act of God or produced by causes beyond his control.
"A tornado lifts A's properly constructed house from A's land and deposits it on




arising after knowledge of the results of this Act of God, and if so,
can it then be limited.1 6
It has been held that an owner of goods may abandon them when
they have been cast onto another's property by an inevitable accident.'1
It has likewise been held that the landowner has the right to remove
goods so placed on his property, and that upon the chattel owner's
reclaiming them there arises an implied contract to pay for the cost of
such removal. 8 In Livezey v. Philadelphia,'9 a case similar to the
principal case, but one in which the right to limit liability was not at
issue, the position was taken that even for a failure to remove after
notice it was not essential to immunity that the chattel owner or his
vendee should abandon their interest in the chattel. In that case a
bridge had washed onto the plaintiff's land as a result of a flood, and
the court, in recognizing that there was an assertion of a claim to the
property, said that neither the chattel owner nor his vendee could create
a liability for a wrong which they had not committed, and for the conse-
quences of which they could not have been made originally to answer.
The court in the principal case, by dictum, took a position diametri-
cally opposed to the Livezey case and indicated that an abandonment
would have been necessary to immunity from a subsequent trespass
liability. It was reasoned that the defendant had exercised such dominion
and control over the wreck that its claim for abandonment could not be
sustained, and that it had become a purchaser of the wreck in its then
existing condition. It seems to follow that the defendant, with full
knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, assumed a duty of removal
and consequent responsibility for the trespass damages resulting from
the failure to remove. Thus it appears that the defendant assumed the
subsequent liability with privity or knowledge as to bar the right to
limit liability.
"
8The duty and obligation of a shipowner to remove sunken or wrecked
vessels from navigable waters is specifically covered by a federal statute and
has no apparent bearing to the problem at hand. The Wreck Act, 30 STAT. 1152(1894), 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1953). This act provides that when a vessel is sunk or
wrecked in navigable waters the owner shall mark it, and must maintain such
marks until the sunken craft is removed or abandoned; a failure to prosecute
immediate removal will be construed as an abandonment. In Petition of Highlands
Nay. Corp., 29 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1928), the vessels in question had sunk by a pier
in navigable waters without fault of the owner. A city ordinance required ship-
owners to remove such sunken or abandoned vessels or else the city would do it
and assess the costs against the owners. It was held that the Wreck Act
recognized the right of abandonment given by the general maritime law and that
the owner intending to abandon could not be held liable for the cost of raising
after abandonment. Accord, City of Newark v. Mills, 35 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1929),
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 722 (1930) ; The Central States, 9 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y.
1935?.
,Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co., 16 Pa. 393 (1851). See also, Annot., 41
A.L.R. 1015 (1926).
"' Tome v. DuBois, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 548 (1867). See also, Annot., 55 Am.
Dec. 508 (1886).
" 64 Pa. 106 (1870).
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There is an appalling lack of authority on the problem of whether
there can be a subsequent liability on an owner of chattels cast ashore
by an Act of God. Regardless of how this problem is resolved it does
not appear that the case will be ripe for a limitation of liability. If there
is a subsequent liability the defendant will be faced with privity or
knowledge; if there is not a liability there is no cause to limit.20
WALTON K. JOYNER
Corporations-Corporate Action for Mismanagement Precluded
Where Sole Stockholder Has No Standing in Equity to Sue
Park Terrace, Inc. v. Burge,1 a recent case of first impression, has
added a third decision to the Park Terrace litigation.2 In the present
case the two defendants had been original shareholders of Park Ter-
race, Inc. The capital structure of the corporation provided that one
class of stock would be called "preferred." All the shares of this class
were held by the Federal Housing Administration. In addition there
were two other classes of stock, Class A and Class B. The Class B
"0 "The doctrine of limitation of liability presupposes that a liability exists
which is to be limited, but if no liability exists, there is nothing to limit." In the
Matter of Cherokee Trawler Corp., 157 F. Supp. 414, 419 (E.D. Va. 1957).
1249 N.C. 308, 106 S.E.2d 478 (1959). Action was commenced on November
3, 1953.
'The first case, Lester v. McLean, 242 N.C. 390, 87 S.E.2d 886 (1955), in-
volved a claim of alleged fraud raised by McLean as a defense to an action
brought by the two defendants in the principal case to recover the purchase price
of the Class A stock. The court found that there had been no fraud and rendered
judgment against McLean.
The second case, Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 473,
85 S.E.2d 677 (1955), remanded on rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956),
concerned an action brought by the corporation against a building construction
company owned by the two defendants in the principal case for alleged failure
to build the housing in accordance with FHA specifications. On rehearing the
court handed down a unique opinion stating that the legal entity of the corpora-
tion was suspended when the number of stockholders was reduced to less than three.
This decision was widely criticized. Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the
One- and Two-Mat Corporation, 34 N.C.L. REv. 471 (1956). After this de-
cision the North Carolina Legislature enacted a statute which provided that the
existence of a corporation was not impaired by the acquistion of all the shares by
one or two persons. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (Supp. 1957). N.C. Sess. Laws
1957, ch. 550, § 31/2, in referring to the amending act, provides: "This Act shall
not affect adjudicated rights." In light of this provision, it seems possible to
argue that the legal entity of Park Terrace, Inc. was suspended for all purposes
by the decision in Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix, vtupra, and thus that the
"corporation" would have no standing to bring this present action. However, it
is submitted that § 3r2 was included only to preclude relitigation by the "corpora-
tion" against Phoenix, and was not intended to affect its status with respect to
other rights. Thus, Park Terrace, Inc. would be deemed to have had "uninter-
rupted existence and to have possessed uninterrupted capacity to act as a corpora-
tion" in all respects, limited only by the fact that the corporation's rights have been
adjudicated as against Phoenix.
' In this manner FHA could step in and control the corporation in the event
of default in the mortgage which it insured. Upon payment of the mortgage
debt, the preferred stock could be redeemed at any time by the corporation.
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stock was called common stock, but in fact it was set up with the
characteristics of preferred.4 Under the charter the Class A was the
only true common stock, and it was given exclusive voting privileges. 5
Each of the defendants owned one third of the A stock, and both of
them were directors of the corporation. The remaining A stock was
held by another party who was the third director. In 1950,6 the two
defendants also held all the outstanding shares of Class B stock, the
subscription price of which had never been fully paid. Pursuant to a
unanimous vote by the directors, the corporation repurchased and can-
celled all the outstanding B stock for an amount in excess of the original
par value subscription price.7 Circumstances indicated that the pay-
ment of this price was against the best interests of the corporation.
Subsequently, in 1951, McLean inspected the corporate properties and
purchased all of the Class A common stock.
This action was brought in the name of the corporation to recover
the entire amount paid to defendants for repurchase of their B stock.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendants, as former directors, had breached
their fiduciary duty to the corporation. No creditors' rights were
involved. FHA, the preferred stockholder, was not a party to this
action and had never complained of any of the defendants' activities.,
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendants' motion for non-
suit was granted. On appeal, the court affirmed. The court held that
where, for several reasons, the sole shareholder is prohibited from
bringing a derivative action, the corporation itself may not maintain the
'The Class B stock was given preferences both as to liquidation and to divi-
dends, while it was deprived of any voting rights.
'These voting rights were subject, however, to the right of FHA to assume
exclusive voting control should the corporation ever be in default in its mortgage
payments.
'The facts in this case arose under the old North Carolina Corporation Act.
However, there appears to be no change in the new act that would modify the
rationale of the principal case. Logically, then, a similar cause of action arising
after July 1, 1957, would be treated in the same manner.
'The repurchase price paid by the corporation was $221,000. This was
$27,558 more than the par value of the stock. See Park Terrace, Inc. v. Burge,
249 N.C. 308, 311, 106 S.E.2d 478, 480 (1959). In their brief, defendants claim
that the price paid to them was not excessive because they had given the corpora-
tion land appraised at a value of $60,000 in return for stock with a par value of
only $23,660; also because the construction company owned by defendants had
made two voluntary reductions in the contract price for the buildings totalling
$146,774. Brief for Appellee, p. 10. However, it is interesting to.note that de-
fendants, acting as directors, refused to repurchase for an offered price of $500
the 70,151 shares of B stock (par value of $70,151) which had been given to the
architect in partial payment for his services. Subsequently, defendants indi-
vidually bought the stock for $500, and these shares were included in the stock
which was later sold to the corporation for a price in excess of par value. These
facts point to the underlying philosophical problem involved in the Park Terrace
litigation, ie., the intrinsic difficulty of applying a corporation act, designed to
regulate large widely held corporations, to a small close corporation.
' The record of the trial court discloses that FHA was at all times informed
as to the stock transactions and financial status of the corporation. Record,
pp. 48-53.
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cause of action in its own name since all proceeds recovered by it would
inure to the benefit of the ineligible shareholder. 9
In disregarding the separate corporate entity, the court relied heavily
upon the leading case of Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber,'° which sets
forth the following doctrine:
When a corporation comes into equity and seeks equitable relief,
we ought to look at the substance of the proceeding, and, if the
beneficiaries of the judgment sought have no standing in equity
to recover, we ought not to become befogged by the fiction of
corporation individuality, and apply the principles of equity to
reach an inequitable result."
It appears from the decision in the principal case that the Home
Fire doctrine has been unequivocably adopted in this jurisdiction. It
becomes important, therefore, to examine the conditions which rendered
the sole shareholder in the principal case so devoid of any standing in
equity that suit by the corporation was precluded in order to prevent his
indirect participation in the recovery. These conditions were: (1)
McLean was not a stockholder at the time of the transaction on which
the claim is based, (2) he had obtained his shares by voluntary purchase
and not by operation of law, (3) the stock that McLean held was
"guilty" stock, the former owners of which had participated in the
alleged wrong. In addition to these three disqualifying factors, the
action was not brought by the corporation for the benefit of creditors
or for the purpose of asserting or endeavoring to protect a title to
property, but solely as a suit in equity as the representative of its sole
stockholder.' 2
It is a well established rule that one who was not a stockholder
at the time of the transaction of which he complains has no standing to
bring a derivative action in the federal courts.' 8 This limitation, known
'At the outset of its opinion, the court stated: "Therefore, the plaintiff
corporation had no stockholders with voting rights other than those who as
officers and directors authorized the purchase by the corporation of the B stock
from these defendants. Consequently, it would seem that neither the plaintiff
corporation nor the holders of the A stock could thereafter attack the validity
of the transaction unless the corporation in doing so was acting in behalf of
creditors." 249 N.C. at 312, 106 S.E.2d at 481. This would imply that no
wrong had ever been done to the corporation. However, the court did not decide
the case on this ground, but based its decision upon the rationale that the lack of
equitable standing on the part of the sole shareholder precluded suit in the
corporate name regardless of the merits of the question as to whether or not
the corporation had ever been wronged.
1 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903).
" Id. at 669, 93 N.W. at 1033.
1" When the corporation sues upon legal titles or rights, the distinction of
entities is observed, but when it sues upon equities of the whole body of stock-
holders the courts look to their equities. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41
(perm. ed. 1931).
13 This rule was originally established to prevent collusive transfers in order
to get a corporate controversy into a federal court on the ground of diversity of
citizenship. Domz, FEDEAL PRocEUREn § 175 (1928) ; 25 VA. L. REv. 100 (1938).
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as the contemporaneous ownership rule, was inaugurated by the federal
courts in the case of Hawes v. Oakland,1 4 and has since been enacted
into Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b). 15 A number of states
have passed similar statutes,16 and several states have adopted the rule
by way of decisional law.17  North Carolina has sometimes been included
in this latter classification by text writers.'8 However, this would seem
to be erroneous since the precise question has never been directly passed
on in this jurisdiction.19
In some states the rule is well settled that a stockholder may bring
a derivative action even though he purchased his shares after the transac-
tion complained of.2 0  It is not certain as to which is the majority view
because many of the cases in which the contemporaneous ownership
rule is said to apply have rested upon fundamental principles of equity,21
and the shareholder could have been precluded from maintaining the
suit-because of participation, acquiescence, estoppel or laches-without
relying on the theory that the shareholder was barred merely because
his stock was purchased subsequent to the alleged wrong.
One New York case22 has gone so far as to extend the contemporane-
" 104 U.S. 450 (1881).1 Authorities have held that rule 23(b) is procedural rather- than substantive.
FLErCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATiONS § 5943 (perm. ed. 1943).16E.g., 24 CALIF. CORP. CODE § 834; 4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1953);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-16 (Supp. 1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 1321 (1953).
Boldenwick v. Bullis, 40 Colo. 253, 90 Pac. 634 (1907); News-Journal
Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d 741 (1941); Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga.
536, 8 S.E. 630 (1889) ; Goldberg v. Ball, 305 I1. App. 273, 27 N.E.2d 575 (1940) ;
Clark v. American Coal Co., 86 Iowa 436, 53 N.W. 291 (1892); Jepsen v.
Peterson, 69 S.D. 388, 10 N.W.2d 749 (1943); Pitcher v. Lone Pine Surprise
Consol. Min. Co., 39 Wash. 608, 81 Pac. 1047 (1905).
Sykes, Right of Stockholder To Attack Transactions Occurring Prior to His
Acquisitiot of Stock, 4 MD. L. REv. 380, at 381 (1940).
.The derivative action involving this problem, Moore v. Mining Co., 104
N.C. 534, 10 S.E. 679 (1889), was ultimately decided on the grounds that the
party seeking to bring the action was not shown to be a bona fide stockholder
and was also charged with laches.
In the principal case the court quotes as follows from the Home Fire decision:
'[A] purchaser of stock cannot complain of prior acts and management of the
corporation. . . .' 249 N.C. at 314, 106 S.E.2d at 482. However, this can only
be construed as dictum, and it appears that purchase of the stock subsequent to
the wrong was of no more than secondary importance among the several cir-
cumstances which precluded suit by the corporation because of the lack of equitable
standing on the part of the sole shareholder.
"0 Parsons v. Joseph, 92 Ala. 403, 8 So. 788 (1891) ; Just v. Idaho Canal &
Improvement Co., 16 Idaho 639, 102 Pac. 381 (1909) ; Mason v. Carrothers, 105
Me. 392, 74 Atl. 1030 (1909) ; Forrester v. Mining Co., 21 Mont 544, 55 Pac. 229(1898) ; North v. Union Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 Ore. 483, 117 Pac. 822 (1911) ;
Roberson v. Draney, 53 Utah 263, 178 Pac. 35 (1919) ; Bank of Mill v. Elk Horn
Coal Co., 133 W.Va. 639, 57 S.E.2d 736 (1950).2IE.g., Boldenwick v. Bullis, 40 Colo, 253, 90 Pac. 634 (1907) (transferor
had participated in the wrong, and laches); Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga. 536,
8 S.E. 630 (1889) (acquiescence and laches); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber,
67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903) (transferor had participated in the wrong).
22 Capital Wine and Spirit Corp. v. Porkrass, 277 App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d
291 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd without opinion, 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951).
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ous ownership rule to bar a suit by the corporation itself. This decision
has been severely criticized.2 The concurring opinion24 of the
presiding justice seems to have based the result of the decision upon the
more logical ground that the sole shareholder had bought the corporation
on the basis of disclosed assets, and to permit the corporation to sue
under these circumstances would be inequitable in that it would allow
the shareholder to recover more than he had bargained and paid for.
It seems very doubtful whether stock ownership acquired subsequent
to the wrong, by itself, should be sufficient reason to justify disregarding
the corporate entity when the corporation is suing in its own name to
recover for prior mismanagement. 25
The second disqualifying factor-that McLean obtained his stock
through voluntary purchase after inspection of the corporation property,
rather than by operation of law-appears to be of much greater signifi-
cance. Concerning this, our court stated: "To allow the plaintiff
corporation to recover the consideration it paid to the defendants for
the B stock would, in substance, allow the present stockholders of the
plaintiff corporation to recover an amount in excess of the sum M. P.
McLean, Jr., paid these defendants .... -2 The true nature of his
right and remedy was an individual action against the transferors of
the stock for misrepresentation, or for breach of guarantee.27  Such a
claim had already been litigated and decided against McLean.28  The
courts should not allow a stock purchase grievance between the trans-
feror and the transferee to be litigated in the corporate name merely
because the grievant has acquired the controlling interest in the corpora-
tion. There has been no other case in North Carolina presenting this
situation. However, the courts which have had occasion to pass upon
this question have held in accord with the principal decision, that the
shareholder is not entitled to avail himself of the corporation to secure
for himself, through that medium, more than he bought.29
The fact that the stock purchased by McLean was "guilty" stock
which had participated in the alleged wrong appears very important
in the court's decision. This factor is closely related to the stock
purchase'grievance discussed above. It is well settled that a shareholder
This involved a New York statute, N.Y. GEN. CoaP. LAW § 61, which is similar
to FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (b).23 Note, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 740 (1951) ; Comment, 65 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1951);
Comment, STAN. L. REv. 151 (1950) ; Comment, 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 166 (1950).
Capital Wine and Spirit Corp. v. Porkrass, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (Peck, J.,
concurring opinion).
2Authority cited note 22 supra.
249 N.C. at 313, 106 S.E.2d at 482.
Capital Wine and Spirit Corp. v. Porkrass, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 at 297 (1st
Dep't 1950).28Lester v. McLean, 242 N.C. 390, 87 S.E.2d 886 (1955).
" Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 Atl. 645 (1917);
Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903).
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who himself has participated in the alleged wrongful conduct cannot
thereafter attack it; 80 and, generally, subsequent purchasers of stock
stand in no better position than their transferors.31 Thus, the great
weight of authority is to the effect that the transferee cannot sue if he
has acquired his title from a shareholder who participated or acquiesced
in the wrong 3 2  However, where the shareholder was an innocent
purchaser for value who had' no notice of such participation or consent
by his transferor, such an action has been allowed. 83 There is no men-
tion in the principal decision whether or not McLean was aware of the
circumstances surrounding the repurchase of the B stock. Presumably,
he had access to all the financial records prior to his purchase of the
corporation. It seems unlikely that any claim could be made that he
did not have either actual or constructive notice. If the transferee of
all the outstanding stock is barred from bringing an individual action
because he has purchased "guilty" stock from the transferor, it would
be clearly a perversion of justice to allow him to recover through use
of the corporate form.34
It should be noted that the decision in the principal case has no
effect upon the rights of creditors. The court emphasized the fact that
creditors are in a protected category and would have had the right to
enforce the payment of the original subscription price by way of a
creditor's bill in equity.
3 5
The result achieved in the principal case seems analogous to those
decisions which prevent an individual from doing business as a corpora-
tion in a field in which he had personally agreed not to compete,38 or
which refuse to allow a corporate recovery on a fire insurance policy
where the sole shareholder had deliberately set fire to the property in
order to collect the insurance.3 7 The decisions in these and all similar
cases are founded on the basic premise that a shareholder should not
30 Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954); FLETCHER,
PRIVATE CoRPoRON os § 5862 (perm. ed. 1943).
" Russell v. Louis Melind Co., 331 Ill. App. 182, 72 N.E.2d 869 (1947);
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5866 (perm. ed. 1943).
-Ibid.
"Parsons v. Joseph, 92 Ala. 403, 8 So. 788 (1891). See also Continental
Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 83 Misc. 340, 144 N.Y. Supp. 801 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
" Matthews v. Headley, 130 Md. 523, 100 Atl. 645 (1917).
" 249 N.C. at 313, 106 S.E.2d at 481. The court cited N.C. GEN. STAT. §
55-65 (1950), which provides that holders of unpaid stock are liable for so much
of the full amount of the shares as is needed to satisfy creditors. Under the new
act the comparable section is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-53 (Supp. 1955), which would
cover situations arising after July 1, 1957.
"Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490 (1875); Kramer v. Old, 119 N.C. 1, 25 S.E.
813 (1896); A. Booth & Co. v. Siebold, 37 Misc. 101, 74 N.Y. Supp. 776 (Sup.
Ct. 1902).
'7Meily Co. v. London & L. Fire Ins. Co., 142 Fed. 873 (E. D. Pa. 1906),
aff'd, 148 Fed. 683 (3rd Cir. 1906); D. I. Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assur. Co.,
284 Ill. 343, 120 N.E. 266 (1918); Kirkpatrick v. Allenama Fire Ins. Co., 102
App. Div. 327, 92 N.Y. Supp. 466 (Sup. Ct. 1905), aff'd, 184 N.Y. 546, 76 N.E.
1098 (1906).
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be allowed to profit in his corporate capacity when he is guilty of some
wrong, or is under some obligation, which would prevent him from so
profiting in his individual capacity.3 8
It is submitted that the result and the rationale of the principal case
are to be commended as a desirable advancement in North Carolina
corporation law. Certainly the ultimate effect of this decision is in line
with the traditional principle that equity will look to the substance of the
proceeding rather than to the form. The courts have consistently utilized
their power to disregard the corporate entity where the sole shareholder
seeks to use his inside position to work fraud or injustice.3 9 The totality
of the circumstances in this case clearly establishes that the sole share-
holder had no equitable standing. Any contrary result would have had
the effect of erecting a statutory shield behind which individuals with
"unclean hands" could enforce their disqualified claims in equity.
SHERWOOD H. SMITH, JR.
Domestic Relations-Alimony Without Divorce and Absolute
Divorce Based on Same Grounds
A wife in Missouri obtained a decree of separate maintenance on the
ground of statutory desertion. Five years later she brought an action
for absolute divorce based on the same ground. Her husband inter-
posed as a defense the doctrine of election of remedies. Held, since an
action for absolute divorce is not inconsistent with an action for separate
maintenance based on the same ground, but is rather an action for further
relief, the doctrine of election of remedies is not applicable. Consequently,
the wife was granted an absolute divorce."
Ordinarily there is no ban on successive divorce actions unless the
doctrine of res judicata may be invoked as a bar thereto.2  For a sub-
sequent action to be precluded it must appear that a court of competent
jurisdiction rendered a final decree on the merits in a prior action in
which the same relief was sought.8 Under this doctrine a decree of
separate maintenance would not be a bar to a subsequent action for
absolute divorce because the two remedies are not the same.4 However,
grounds litigated or questions determined in the separate maintenance
proceeding are res judicata in a subsequent action for absolute divorce.0
Thus, as of its date, a decree in favor of a wife in an action for separate
: Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 332 (1939).
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
41 (perm. ed. 1931).
'Prough v. Prough, 308 S.W.2d 294 (Mo. 1957).
2Meegan v. Meegan, 60 R.I. 131, 197 Atl. 221 (1938).
Bidwell v. Bidwell, 139 N.C. 402, 52 S.E. 55 (1905).
'Jenkins v. Jenkins, 125 Cal. App. 2d 109, 269 P.2d 908 (1954)
'Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952).
[Vol. 37
NOTES AND COMMENTS
maintenance establishes her as the innocent and the husband as the
guilty party.'
In a few instances the question has arisen as to whether the doctrine
of election of remedies bars the plaintiff in a prior support action from
maintaining an action for absolute divorce.7 This question may arise,
as in the principal case, where the husband has been guilty of misconduct
for which the wife may obtain an absolute divorce or separate mainte-
nance and she elects to sue for the latter and subsequently initiates an
action for absolute divorce. The general rule in such cases is that the
doctrine of election does not apply since the two remedies are not
inconsistent inasmuch as they have different objects and effects. 8 A
decree awarding the wife separate maintenance affords her only partial
relief whereas a decree granting her absolute divorce amounts to exac-
tion of the full remedy.9 Thus, the result reached by the Missouri
court in the instant case appears to be in line with the weight of
authority.
While the problem before the court in the principal case has never
arisen in North Carolina 0 the laws of this state provide a perfect setting
for it to rear its troublesome head. North Carolina, like Missouri, al-
lows a wife to sue for alimony without divorce (another name for
separate maintenance) when her husband has been guilty of misconduct
for which the wife may obtain an absolute divorce."' Thus, when the
husband commits adultery, for example, the wife has two courses of
action which she may pursue initially, an action for alimony without
divorce or an action for absolute divorce.' 2  If she elects to sue for
absolute divorce she may not obtain alimony.13  Therefore, she may
elect to sue for alimony without divorce in order to receive continued
support from her wrongdoing husband. If she then waits two years
and seeks an absolute divorce on the grounds of two years separation,
'Jenkins v. Jenkins, 125 Cal. App. 2d. 109, 269 P.2d 908 (1954).7
.d.
'Id.; Kunze v. Kunze, 153 Minn. 5, 189 N.W. 447 (1922).
. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 125 Cal. App. 2d 109, 269 P.2d 908 (1954).
10 Perhaps the reason for this was stated by the court in the principal case
where it opined that its inability to find a similar case in Missouri might be due
to the fact "that in most instances the husband-loser in the suit for separate
maintenance,.-is content, if not highly pleased, to exchange that status for absolute
divorce." Prough v. Prough, 308 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Mo. 1957).
"N.C. GEN STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1957).
"2 The latter is not immediately available, however, since in her complaint for
absolute divorce the wife must allege that to her knowledge the "facts set forth
therein as grounds for divorce have existed . . . for at least six months prior to
filing the complaint." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (Supp. 1957). There is no such
time requirement in the case of alimony without divorce and the wife can properly
institute such action as soon as the grounds are discovered. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
50-16 (Supp. 1957); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 234 N.C. 1, 65 S.E.2d 375(1951).
"*Livingston v. Livingston, 235 N.C. 515, 70 S.E.2d 480 (1952).
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she will have her divorce but will lose her continued support. 14 But,
suppose she initially sues for alimony without divorce on the ground of
adultery. Then, immediately after obtaining her alimony decree, she
brings an action for absolute divorce using the same adultery as her
ground. Would our court not grant the divorce? Since the weight of
authority appears to indicate that the divorce would not be defeated
because of the doctrine of res judicata or the doctrine of election of
remedies, and since there does not appear to be anything in our statutes
or case law to prevent this procedure, it is surprising not to find a case
among our supreme court decisions discussing this possibility. This is
especially surprising since this procedure, if allowed, would afford the
injured wife a means of getting around our questionable policy15 of not
allowing the wife any alimony in an action for absolute divorce.
That the better reasoning militates in favor of allowing an injured
wife to maintain a subsequent action for absolute divorce on the same
ground for which she has previously obtained alimony without divorce
seems to admit of little doubt. The General Assembly has seen fit to
authorize a wife both alimony and absolute divorce when her husband
commits adultery. Nowhere have they indicated that they intended to
deny one by granting the* other. Moreover, as already indicated, when-
ever similar situations have arisen in other jurisdictions the courts have
almost unanimously held that the wife may use the same ground for
obtaining both forms of relief.
So long as the policy of this state is to deny alimony in actions for
absolute divorce, but not to prevent an alimony decree previously
obtained from surviving an absolute divorce except in certain instances,"0
it would appear desirable for our General Assembly to pass a statute
making it clear that a wife who has grounds for both alimony without
divorce and absolute divorce can obtain both remedies. This would
resolve any uncertainty which presently exists and could be accomplished
by simply adding to the statute providing for alimony without divorce
(G.S. § 50-16) a provision to the effect that
Any action initiated pursuant to, or judgment obtained under, the
provisions of this section on grounds that would also constitute
grounds for absolute divorce shall not bar the plaintiff in such
action, or who obtains such judgment, from maintaining an action
for absolute divorce on the same grounds.
JOHN R. INGLE
N.C. GEr. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1957).See Note, 36 N.C.L. Rzv. 203 (1958).
"
6N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1957).
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Domestic Relations-Effect of Community Property Laws on
Interpretation of "Gross Income" in North Carolina Alimony
Without Divorce Award
In the recent case of Kinross-Wright v. Kinross-Wright,1 the North
Carolina Supreme Court was asked to interpret for the first time the
term "gross income" as used in an alimony judgment. Plaintiff, a
resident of North Carolina, had been granted an alimony without
divorce award2 to be paid by defendant, at that time a resident of Texas.
The award provided that defendant was to pay $350 or 30% of his
gross income, whichever was greater, to plaintiff each month for the
support and maintenance of herself and their two children. Defendant
was ordered to forward to plaintiff an authenticated copy of his federal
income tax return for each taxable year thereafter. It was further pro-
vided that if defendant's gross income "'as shown on said tax return"3
exceeded the sum of $14,000, a sum equal to 30%o of the excess over
$14,000 divided by 12 was to be added to each monthly payment due
plaintiff and children for the next twelve months. Two months after
the alimony award, plaintiff was granted an absolute divorce on
grounds of two years separation, without prejudice to the prior alimony
award. Almost immediately thereafter, defendant remarried and con-
tinued to live in Texas with his second wife. Defendant later filed a
petition for modification and clarification of the alimony judgment.
Plaintiff then filed a petition alleging that defendant's gross income had
exceeded $14,000 and that he had failed to pay her 30% of the excess
as ordered. Defendant contended that the term "gross income" as used
in the alimony judgment did not include income which, under the
Texas community property laws,5 was the income and property of his
second wife. It was this dispute, inter alia, which the North Carolina
court was asked to decide.
'248 N.C. 1, 102 S.E.2d 469 (1958).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1957).
248 N.C. at 3, 102 S.E.2d at 470. (Emphasis added.)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1957), which provides in effect that a prior
alimony award will be terminated by a subsequent absolute divorce obtained by
the wife on the ground of separation for the statutory period (two years), was not
applicable here since the alimony award was obtained in 1953 and the amendment
did not become effective until January 1, 1956. See Yow v. Yow, 243 N.C. 79,
89 S.E.2d 867 (1955) ; Rayfield v. Rayfield, 242 N.C. 691, 89 S.E.2d 399 (1955).
'TEX. CoNsT. ANN. art. 16 § 15; TEX. RF-v. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4613-14,
4619 (1951).
"The community property system has lived since the days of the rude tribes of
Germany when the wives who shared the fighting were thought to be worthy of a
share in the spoils. When Germanic Goths conquered and occupied Spain they
carried the concept of community property with them to that nation, and one of
the Gothic rulers of Spain, by statute, made community of matrimonial gains the
general law of Spain. Spain, in turn, introduced the community property to the
new world, and by this manner it became part of the law of Texas." TEX. CONST.
ANN. art. 16, § 15, Interpretive Commentary at 102.
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It is well settled under Texas law that a married person's legal gross
income consists of only one-half of the total amount which he produces.0
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to give this mean-
ing to the term "gross income," and instead concluded that the term as
used in the alimony judgment meant gross income as interpreted under
the North Carolina law. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied
entirely on two cases from other jurisdictions-Alexander v. Alexander,7
and Arthur v. Arthur.8  These involved the construction of the terms
"gross income" and "gross earnings," respectively, as used in separation
agreements.9
In Alexander, the defendant was required by a separation agree-
ment, approved by a divorce decree, to furnish a true and certified copy
of his federal income tax return, and "if, as shown thereby or otherwise
established, the defendant should have gross income [in excess of a
specified amount] from whatever source derived [then the defendant
was to pay a percentage of the excess to the plaintiff] . . . ."10 The
agreement had been executed in Missouri, a non-community property
jurisdiction. Defendant thereafter remarried, moved to Texas, and then
claimed that his gross income should be reduced by one-half in com-
puting the amount due under the contract. It was held, under the
particular circumstances, that the Texas law could not be invoked so
as to reduce the payments.
In Arthur, the California court was called upon to interpret a
separation contract, executed in New York, which provided that the
defendant was to pay a certain percentage of his "gross earnings" to the
plaintiff. Defendant later remarried and moved to the community
property state of California."l It was apparent that the contract had
not been executed in contemplation of defendant's future marriage, much
less in contemplation of the possibility that defendant might subsequent-
ly move to a community property jurisdiction.'2 Further, no criterion
I The community property system is specifically recognized in the Texas
Constitution and is set out in detail in the statutes of that state. These statutes
clearly provide that any earnings of either husband or wife become community
income, and that the wife's interest is equal to the husband's. Her interest in the
community is properly characterized as a present vested interest equal and equiva-
lent to that of her husband; one-half of the community income is therefore income
of the wife. See TEx. CoNsT. ANN. art. 16 § 15; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.
4613-14, 4619 (1951). See also Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930) ; Wright
v. Hays' Adm'r, 10 Tex. 130 (1848).
764 F. Supp. 123 (1945), aff'd, 158 F.2d 429 (1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
845 (1947).
8147 Cal. App. 2d 252, 305 P.2d 171 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
o These are apparently the only reported cases in the United States which even
remotely involve the Kinross-Wright situation.
" 64 F. Supp. at 125. (Emphasis added.)
21 "In Louisiana, Texas, California, Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada,
and Washington, what is known as the 'community system of matrimonial gains'
prevails." TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 294 (new abr. ed. 1940).
" 147 Cal. App. 2d at-, 305 P.2d at 174.
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was set forth in the contract whereby the meaning of "gross earnings"
might be ascertained. With these factors in mind, the court held that
"the word 'earnings' is used to indicate the amount produced, not that
part only which may vest in defendant by virtue of the community
property law."'13
There are important distinctions between the Alexander and Arthur
cases and the Kinross-Wright case. In the principal case, the judgment
of the lower court expressly stated that the plaintiff's right to any in-
crease in the amount of alimony being paid to her was to be determined
by the amount of defendant's gross income "as shown on said tax return
for the preceding year." There was nothing in the judgment which in-
dicated that defendant's gross income was to be determined solely under
North Carolina law. That the court meant defendant's gross income
as shown on his tax return, whether it be determined under the laws of
North Carolina, Texas, or some other state to which defendant might
become subject, is the only interpretation to which the clear and simple
language used by the lower court lends itself.
It is true that in the Alexander case the defendant was required to
furnish plaintiff a copy of his tax return; however, the contract there
clearly did not limit the amount of gross income to that amount as shown
on the tax return. On the contrary, it was expressly provided that
gross income might be "otherwise established." Under this broad lan-
guage, together with the surrounding circumstances, the federal court
was justified in ruling as it did.
Further, both the Alexander and Arthur cases involved contracts
made and intended to be executed in states which did not have a com-
munity property system, and by parties, all of whom were residents of
such states at that time. In neither case was it contemplated that the
defendant would remarry and subsequently move to a community prop-
erty state. In the principal case, however, defendant was already resid-
ing in Texas and had become subject to its community property laws
at the time the final alimony judgment was rendered.' 4 The record
further indicates that the Kinross-Wright alimony suit was brought by
plaintiff in contemplation of a subsequent absolute divorce from de-
21 Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated: "[S]o far as plaintiff is
concerned, his contracting a marriage with another woman thereafter and his
removal to the State of California where such other woman had a vested interest
in half of his earnings as community property are no different in effect than his
execution of an assignment of one-half of such earnings to some finance company
in consideration of a loan"' Ibid.
" The original summons was issued February 13, 1952, at which time both
plaintiff and defendant were residents of North Carolina. On March 5, 1952, an
interlocutory order for subsistence and counsel fees was entered. In January of
1953, defendant moved his residence from North Carolina to Texas; therefore,
when the cause came on for final hearing on September 3, 1953, and the final
alimony decree was entered, defendant .d been a legal resident of Texas for
approximately nine months.
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fendant; and that their marital difficulties had arisen from de-
fendant's prolonged association with the woman whom he married
within a month after the date of the absolute divorce. Thus, the parties
must have known at the time of the alimony award that defendant in-
tended to remarry and reside in Texas with his second wife after the
absolute divorce was granted. It appears, then, that all parties must
have contemplated that defendant's gross income as shown on his tax
return would be determined under the Texas law rather than the North
Carolina law, so long as defendant filed his income tax return as a
resident of that state.
A careful reading of the Alexander and Arthur cases reveals that
the court in each case reached its decision by applying the general rules
of construction applicable to written instruments. The Alexander case
plainly states: "[T]he question posed turns upon an interpretation of
the phrase 'gross income' as the parties understood and used that term
when they executed the contract."'I5 In the principal case, the court was
construing a judgment; but the rules of construction of written instru-
ments also apply to the construction of judgments.'8 A judgment must
be construed in the light of the situation of the court, 17 what the court
had before it,' 8 and the accompanying circumstances.' 9
If the North Carolina court had given effect to the apparent intention
of the parties, based upon the surrounding circumstances, and to the
plain language of the judgment, the term "gross income" might well
have been construed in accordance with the operation of the Texas
community property law. However, the court makes no mention of in-
tention of the parties, and in following the holdings of the Alexander
and Arthur cases states: "The reasoning in these two cases ... appears
to be sound, and may well be applied with approval to the factual situa-
tion in the instant case."'20 It is not certain whether the basis of the
present decision is (1) that the court found the actual intent of the
parties to be that North Carolina law was to control, notwithstanding
13 158 F.2d at 430.
'6 Decker v. Tyree, 204 Ky. 302, 264 S.W. 726 (1924); Perman Oil Co. v.
Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 107 S.W.2d 564 (1937).
"' Rinaldo v. Board of Medical Examiners, 123 Cal. App. 712, 12 P.2d 32
(Dist. Ct. App. 1932); cf. Bank of Union v. Redwine, 171 N.C. 559, 88 S.E. 878
(1916).
1 Toms v. Holmes, 294 Ky. 233, 171 S.W.2d 245 (1943). The court's
province is to construe contracts, not to make contracts for the parties, and neither
court nor jury may disregard contracts expressed in plain terms and unambiguous
language. See Belk's Dep't Store v. George Washington Fire Ins. Co., 208
N.C. 267, 180 S.E. 63 (1935) ; King v. Davis, 190 N.C. 737, 130 S.E. 707 (1925).
1" Christiano v. Christiano, 131 Conn. 589, 41 A.2d 779 (1945). In construing
a writing in order to determine the true intent of the parties, the following should
be considered: the subject matter, the situation of the parties, and the circum-
stances at the time -when the writing was executed. See Bank of Union v.
Redwine, 171 N.C. 559, 88 S.E. 878 (1916).20 248 N.C. at 12, 102 S.E.2d at 477.
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the apparent intention of the parties, or (2) that, as a matter of public
policy, where it is not otherwise clearly expressed to the contrary, an
alimony award will not be diminished by the defendant's subsequent
remarriage in a community property state.
It is submitted that the decision seems sound from the standpoint
of public policy. Since the prime purpose of an alimony award is to
provide support for a defendant's wronged wife and family, he should
not, by the simple expedient of remarrying in a state where community
property laws obtain, be allowed thereby to divest his first wife and
family of a large part of their support.
Many variations of the Kinross-Wright situation might arise in the
future. If the Kinross-Wright decision be considered as a judicial
expression of public policy, it seems likely that the North Carolina
court, in interpreting the term "gross income" in separation contracts or
alimony judgments, will continue to disregard the community property
laws of other states, absent a specific provision to the contrary.
ROBERT C. SOLES, JR.
Husband and Wife-Tenancy by the Entirety-Surviving Spouse's
Right to Contribution on Paying Debt Secured by Mortgage on
Entireties Property
H and W hold a house and lot as tenants by the entireties.1 The
property has a market value of $20,000. Part of this value is due to
recent improvements on the property, for which H and W jointly ex-
ecuted notes and a mortgage. H dies when there is still $8,000 owing.
W succeeds to the entire fee and petitions H's executors for $4,000,
claiming that amount as H's share of the joint debt. Under these facts,
the Supreme Court of Delaware recently held in In re Keil's Estate,
2
that the claim should be allowed.
The recovery was allowed on the principle of equitable contribution.
The rationale of the principle is that where parties are under a common
burden or liability, one joint debtor who pays the whole debt, or more
than his share, is entitled, in equity, to contribution from his co-obligors.
3
"' Estates by the entireties are creatures of the common law created by legal
fiction and based wholly on the common-law doctrine that husband and wife are
one, and, therefore there is but one estate, and in contemplation of law, but one
person owning the whole .... By reason of their legal unity by marriage, the
husband and wife together take the whole estate as one person. Neither has a
separate estate or interest in the land, but each has the whole estate. Upon the
death of one the entire estate and interest belongs to the other, not by virtue of
survivorship, but by virtue of the title that vested under the original limitation.'"
Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 493, 94 S.E.2d 466, 469 (1956), quoting 4
THomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1803 (perm. ed. 1940).
'-Del.-, 145 A.2d 563 (1958).
* 13 At. Jua., Contribution § 3 (1938).
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The Keil case, and other cases4 in accord, hold that the right to con-
tribution flows from the fact that both parties were primarily liable as
joint makers of the notes, paying no attention to the characteristics of
the tenancy under which the security property was held.
Lopez v. Lopez,5 illustrates a line of authority6 contra to the holding
in the Keil case. There the Florida court disallowed the claim of the
surviving entireties tenant, saying that the doctrine of equitable con-
tribution applies only to prevent one debtor from having to bear
more than his share of a common burden, or to prevent unjust enrich-
ment of a non-paying debtor where his co-obligor paid the whole amount.
Applying this standard, the court held that no common burden existed,
because each was obligated for the whole debt, since each held the
whole fee in the mortgaged property. The court further pointed out that
there could be no unjust enrichment if the survivor were made to pay
the entire debt, since the decedent's estate succeeded to no interest in
the redeemed property.
The two lines of authority can be summarized as follows: Where the
survivor gets contribution the courts emphasize that it was a joint
obligation, stressing the notes, and playing down the tenancy by the
entireties in the mortgaged property. Courts that deny contribution
emphasize the nature of the tenancy, and hold that the debt takes on
similar characteristics, at least as between the debtors. Both lines of
authority leave the liability of the parties to the mortgagee unchanged.
North Carolina first ruled on the question presented in the principal
case in Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Black,7 where it was held,
with no authority cited, that the survivor was entitled to contribution.
The reason given was the same as that of the Delaware court in the
Keil case, that "the unity of person is an incident of the estate, . .. it is
not incident to the note."
8
' Magenheimer v. Councilman, 76 Ind. App. 583, 125 N.E. 77 (1919) ; Cunning-
ham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930) ; Nobile v. Bartletta, 109
N.J. Eq. 119, 156 Ad. 483 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931) (partly based on local rule
that entireties tenants hold as tenants in common during their joint lives)
Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Black, 198 N.C. 219, 151 S.E. 269 (1929);
In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 84 A.2d 209 (1951) (vigorous dissent);
Newson v. Shackleford, 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S.W.2d 384 (1931) (Magenheinier case,
suzpra, relied upon, no contra authority coming to attention of court).
See Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 96 S.E.2d 788 (1957), where con-
tribution was allowed against the estate of the deceased member of a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship.
90 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956).
'Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870 (1927); Robinson v. Bogert,
187 Misc. 735, 64 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1946) ; In re Dell's Estate, 154 Misc. 216, 276
N.Y.S. 960 (1935); Geldart v. Bank of N. Y. and Trust Co., 209 App. Div. 581,
205 N.Y.S. 238 (1924).
See also, In re Keil's Estate, (Mr. Justice Bramhall's dissent), -Del.-, 145
A.2d at 566; In re Dowler's Estate, (Mr. Justice Bells' dissent), 368 Pa. at 525,
84 A.2d at 211.
7198 N.C. 219 .151 S.E. 269 (1929).
1 Id. at 221, 15 S.E. at 270.
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In Underwood v. Ward,9 the North Carolina court seems to have
considered the character of ownership of the security by holding that
since the deceased's estate holds no interest in the mortgaged entireties
property, the estate's liability to the widow for contribution is not such
a claim as would qualify for preference as a secured claim under G.S.
§ 28-10510 thus, the estate being insolvent, the widow had to share
pro-rata with the general creditors.
In Montsinger v. White,"- the husband alone had executed the note
and mortgage and had later conveyed the property to himself and his
wife as tenants by the entireties. After the husband's death the widow
paid the entire debt, and filed a general claim against the deceased's
insolvent estate. The court held that by paying the debt she became
subrogated to the claim of the mortgagee. The mortgagee's rights
under G.S. § 28-105 are limited to a general claim against the insolvent
estate only to the extent of any deficiency resulting after he has first
proceeded against the security. Since here the security was sufficient
to satisfy the debt, the mortgagee would have had no right of action
against the estate, thus the widow, being subrogated, had no such right.
Thus, in North Carolina the rather anomalous situation exists that
where the survivor pays the joint debt he may receive contribution
from the deceased's estate. If, on the other hand, he pays the deceased's
sole debt, he is merely subrogated to the mortgagee's claim and if the
decedent's estate is insolvent, can collect nothing unless the security is
worth less than the amount of the debt.
The North Carolina court has not gone into the ramifications of the
doctrine of equitable contribution in the entireties cases. The court,
however, has generally cited with approval, American Jurisprudence's 12
statement: "In other words, when any burden ought, from the relation-
ship of the parties or in respect of property held by them, to be equally
borne and each party is in aequoi jure, contribution is due if one has
been compelled to pay more than his share. The doctrine is founded
not upon contract, but upon principles of equity."'3 (Emphasis added.)
Applying this equitable standard where the obligation is joint and one
tenant dead, neither the "relationship of the parties" nor the nature of
the security property ownership would seem to require that the "burden"
be "equally borne." The entire equity of redemption, formerly owned
by the marital unit, is now owned by the surviving spouse alone and the
p239 N.C. 513, 80 S.E.2d 267 (1954).
10 "The debts of the decedent must be paid in the following order: First class.
Debts which by law have a specific lien on property to an amount not exceeding
the value of such property... !'
"240 N.C. 441, 82 S.E2d 362 (1954).
12 See note 3 supra.
"Nebel v. Nebel, 223 N.C. 676, 685, 28 S.E.2d 207, 213 (1943).
See also Bunker v. Llewellyn, 221 N.C. 1, 18 S.E.2d 717 (1942).
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decedent's estate has no interest in the security property. From the
unjust enrichment standpoint, it seems that equity is not accomplished
by allowing the windfall which results when the survivor redeems the
whole mortgagor interest and is allowed to recover half the amount paid.
Conversely, if contribution is not allowed there is no unjust efirichment
because, having no further interest in the property, the decedent spouse's
estate acquires no unpaid-for benefit. Granted that his estate is liable
to the mortgagee jointly and severally with the survivor, this should not
be the primary consideration in determining the liability of the parties
as between themselves.
When a mortgagor pays off the secured indebtedness, he redeems his
equity in the property.14 When one of several joint mortgagors pays
the whole debt, the other principal obligors must redeem their respective
shares from the one who has paid the whole debt.'8 The amount of
contribution that can be claimed against the obligors who have not yet
paid is in direct proportion to the share in the security owned by each
debtor.16 Thus, the doctrine of contribution, in the case of tenants in
common or their estates, works to prevent the unjust enrichment of
those who did not share in the payment of the mortgage debt. But, in
the case of tenants by the entireties, this doctrine causes unjust enrich-
ment because the decedent's estate had nothing to redeem by contributing.
If X buys a house and executes a mortgage and notes for the
purchase money, and gets his friend, Y, to sign the notes, as an ac-
commodation party, we have a similar situation to that where one of the
entireties tenants has died. Both X and Y are liable,' 7 but as between
the parties, if X is made to pay, since he got the entire benefit of the
transaction, he cannot force Y to contribute.' 8 Likewise, if Y is made to
pay he would have a right of action for the whole amount against X
since the entire benefit went to X.19 Also, where X owns a fee subject
to a mortgage, and sells his interest to Y, who assumes the mortgage,
X becomes a surety for Y, who is primarily liable.20  Y, who receives
the entire benefit, cannot make X contribute, and if X is called upon
by the mortgagee for payment, he can look to Y for reimbursement. 21
In the principal case situation the tenancy by which the mortgaged
1 Riddick v. Davis, 220 N.C. 120, 16 S.E.2d 662 (1941); Stevens v. Turlington,
186 N.C. 191, 119 S.E. 210 (1923).
"Bain v. Howell, 247 Ala. 514, 25 So.2d 167 (1946); 86 C.J.S., Tenancy in
Common § 61 (1954). Cf. Raynor v. Raynor, 212 N.C. 181, 193 S.E. 216 (1937).
16 Ibid.
'
7 Dry v. Reynolds, 205 N.C. 571, 172 S.E. 351 (1933).
1 ". . . There is no obligation between the maker and the accommodation
endorser that the latter shall pay the debt. . . " First and Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
Hinton, 216 N.C. 159, 160, 4 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1939).N.C. GEN. STAT. § 26-3 (1953).






property was held results in the payor's receiving-as in the above
illustrations-the benefit of his payment. Therefore, it would seem
that equity would require that the nature of the security ownership,
rather than the nature of the obligation, be the controlling factor and
that contribution should not be allowed.
ROBERT L. LINDSEY
Sales-Implied Warranty of Title-When Cause of Action
for Breach Accrues after Purchase'of Precarious Title
In the recent case of Henry Vann Co. v. Barefoot,1 plaintiff and de-
fendants traded motor vehicles. Defendants' automobile had previously
been used for illegal transportation of whiskey, and after the trade it was
confiscated by federal agents. Plaintiff sued for the reasonable value
of the vehicle it had traded to the defendants on the ground of total
failure of consideration. Held, plaintiff had stated a cause of action
for breach of an implied warranty of title, but that in order to recover
it must prove that by legal proceedings the defendants' title to the
vehicle was divested as of a time prior to the trade.
The Supreme Court, reversing the court below, held, inter alia,
that plaintiff need not prove the offense which made the car subject to
confiscation. Accordingly, there is left open the question whether if the
offense prior to the trade had been proved, but not that the title of
defendants had been divested by legal proceedings, plaintiff could have
recovered. This necessarily depends on the answer to the following
question: If the vendor has committed some act or knows of circum-
stances which make his title precarious, 2 and he fails to inform his
purchaser of this fact, may the purchaser immediately sue him for breach
of an implied warranty of title, or must he wait until he has been dis-
possessed?3 In attempting to answer the hypothetical question posed,
it is necessary to consider the scope of an implied warranty of title, and
what constitutes a breach thereof.
Implied warranty of title is a well established doctrine in the United
States. The seller of personal property is held to warrant impliedly
'249 N.C. 22, 105 S.E.2d 104 (1958).
' The principle of transfer of a precarious title may be illustrated by this
anecdote: John owes Robert ten dollars. John and Robert are riding together
on a train. It is held up. The robbers are coming down the aisle of the car
relieving the passengers of their purses. Just before the robbers get to them
John hands Robert a bill and says, "Here is the ten dollars I owe you."
'It should be noted at this point that fraud of the seller inducing the sale of
personal property may entitle the purchaser to rescind the contract and re-
cover the consideration he has paid, even though the paramount title holder
has not recovered the property nor the vendee suffered any actual damages.
Case v. Hall, 24 Wend. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840). However, the difficulties of
proof presented by this remedy would make it highly desirable from the buyer's
point of view to be able to sue for breach of the implied warranty of title.
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the title unless a contrary intention appears. 4 An implied warranty of
title is, in substance, a warranty that the seller's title is perfect and free
from all liens and incumbrances or partial defects.5 Thus, where at
the time of the sale the chattels were subject to forfeiture to the federal
government for the illegal acts of the seller in violation of the revenue
laws, the subsequent enforcement of such forfeiture has been held a
breach of the seller's warranty of title.6 This holding makes it apparent
that the scope accorded the implied warranty of title covers the situation
where the vendor knowingly and without disclosure has passed to the
purchaser a precarious title later divested.
The question still remains as to when the cause of action arises for
the breach of the implied warranty. A majority of the jurisdictions, in-
cluding North Carolina, which have not adopted the Uniform Sales Act
treat the warranty of title implied in every sale as similar to a covenant
for quiet enjoyment, which goes to the possession rather than the title.
It is not deemed broken for the purpose of an action on the breach until
there has been an actual or constructive eviction of the purchaser by the
paramount title holder. 7 "The seller is bound to protect the buyer from
all evictions arising from circumstances anterior to the sale." Thus
in North Carolina an eviction is a condition precedent to the bringing
of an action for breach of an implied warranty of title.9 Under this rule
it is manifest that the purchaser of a precarious title cannot maintain
such action until his possession has been disturbed in some way by the
paramount title holder.
A minority of the courts have held that there is an immediate breach
of the implied warranty of title arising at the time of the sale, reasoning
that the implied warranty of title to chattels is analogous to a covenant
of seisin in a deed which is broken, if at all, immediately upon the de-
livery of the deed.10 Thus, courts using this analogy have held that the
breach occurred at the time of the sale. The result was that sometimes
a purchaser lost both the purchase price and the goods because the
statute of limitations had run before claim was made by the paramount
title holder." Fear of this possibility is apparently responsible for
'1 WILLISTON, SALES § 218 (rev. ed. 1948).
M'irtin v. McDonald, 168 N.C. 232, 84 S.E. 258 (1915) ; see also 1 WILLISTON,
SALES § 218 (rev. ed. 1948).
'McKnight v. Devlin, 52 N.Y. 399 (1873); Henry Vann Co. v. Barefoot, 249
N.C. 22, 105 S.E.2d 104 (1958).
7 Roberts v. Hill, 78 Ga. App. 264, 50 S.E.2d 706 (1948) ; Hodges v. Wilkinson,
111 N.C. 56, 15 S.E. 941 (1892); Wilson v. Tihcheff, 196 Okl. 243, 164 P.2d 396(1945) ; see also 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 221 (rev. ed. 1948).
8 Myers v. Smith, 27 Md. 91, 110 (1867).
'Hodges v. Wilkinson, 111 N.C. 56, 15 S.E. 941 (1892).
"oChancellor v. Wiggins, 4 Ky. (B. Mon.) 202, 39 Am. Dec. 499 (1843);
Spillane v. Corey, 323 Mass. 673, 84 N.E.2d 5 (1949) ; Perkins v. Whelan, 116
Mass. 542 (1874) ; see also 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 221 (rev. ed. 1948).
1 Chancellor v. Wiggins, supra note 9; Perkins v. Whelan, supra note 9.
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insistence by the majority, including North Carolina, on eviction as a
prerequisite to recovery.' 2  Actually, neither rule adequately protects
the purchaser. Under the majority rule he is denied any recourse against
his vendor until he has been evicted, and under the minority rule he
runs the risk of having his rights barred by the statute of limitations.
Under the Uniform Sales Act there is an implied warranty on the
part of the seller that he has the right to sell the goods, and there is a
further implied warranty that the buyer should have and enjoy quiet
possession of the goods as against any lawful claims existing at the time
of the sale.' 3 The first warranty has been held to be separate and inde-
pendent from the operation of the second one.' 4 Thus, where the
vendor at the time of the sale had in fact no title to the goods and there-
fore no right to sell them, the purchaser was given the right to proceed
immediately against him even though there had been no eviction.' 5 It
would appear that the same result should follow in the case where the
vendor had a precarious title to the goods. Apparently the Sales Act
contemplates an implied warranty that the seller has the right to sell a
good, clean title which is certainly something more than a precarious
title. Thus under the Sales Act it could be argued that a purchaser of
a precarious title without notice could sue his vendor immediately for
breach of his implied warranty that he had the right to sell the goods
notwithstanding the fact that there had been no eviction. If there is a
breach of warranty by the seller, the Uniform Sales Act authorizes the
buyer at his election to rescind the sale, offer to return the goods to
the seller, and recover any part of the purchase price which has been
paid.' 6 Thus, apparently the purchaser of a precarious title would be
able to recover the purchase price even though there had been no eviction.
However, since the breach necessarily arises at the time of the sale, the
statute of limitations may have run before the purchaser discovers the
defect in his title. In such case, the purchaser would have to rely upon
the implied warranty of quiet enjoyment, and would encounter the same
obstacle under the Uniform Sales Act that he would under the North
Carolina rule-namely, the requirement of an eviction before he may
sue for the breach.
It is submitted that the purchaser of a precarious title should be
allowed to sue on his warranty as soon as he discovers the nature of his
title regardless of whether a claim has been asserted by a superior title
holder. A purchaser is placed in a most undesirable position when he is
denied the right to sue before eviction. The effect of such denial is to
"2 Gross v. Kierski, 41 Cal. 111 (1871) ; see also 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 221
(rev. ed. 1948).
' Uniform Sales Act § 13.14Martin v. Coffman, 87 Ohio App. 398, 95 N.E.2d 286 (1949).
5 Ibid.
"' Uniform Sales Act § 69.
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allow a vendor, who knows that he is going to lose or runs great risk of
losing his goods, to pass this risk on to an innocent purchaser who must
bear it until claim is asserted by the paramount title holder. To allow
a vendor to pass on to an unknowing purchaser goods which he deems
"too hot to handle" is unconscionable, and a remedy should be available
at once. If plaintiff's right to recover the purchase price is delayed,17
the dangers of the defendant disappearing or becoming judgment proof
in the interim are imminent. Justice demands that he be given a remedy
to recover the purchase price immediately upon discovering such fact."
The effect of allowing the purchaser to sue on his warranty at this time
would be to afford him the adequate protection he needs against such
bargains and in so doing would not subject him to the danger of having
his action barred by the statute of limitations before he discovers the
defect. The vendor would not be prejudiced by such action as he is
protected against any false assertions made by the purchaser by the
requirement that the purchaser must prove in his action the actual
existence of a superior claim to the goods.19
The North Carolina Legislature might well consider abolishing the
doctrine that an implied warranty of title is the equivalent of a covenant
of quiet enjoyment. Disturbance of possession should not be the ex-
clusive way in which breach of the warranty can be established. This
appears to be the view adopted in the Uniform Commercial Code. 20 A
comment on the applicable subsection states that it
makes provision for a buyer's basic needs in respect to a title
which he in good faith expects to acquire by his purchase, namely,
that he receive a good, clean title transferred to him also in a
rightful manner so that he will not be exposed to a lawsuit in
order to protect it.
7. The plaintiff in suing for breach of warranty would more than likely seek
rescission as his remedy rather than damages. "Logically his recovery, if his
action is tried before he has been evicted, should be based on the chance of his
being subsequently deprived of the benefit of what he has bought. Such a measure
of damage is, however, so speculative as to be difficult of practical application."
1 WLLisToN, SALES § 221 (rev. ed. 1948).
"s A buyer has been held entitled to rescind on the ground of mutual mistake
when ties sold were, without the knowledge of either party, in danger of destruc-
tion by forest fire at the time of the sale. Richardson Lumber Co. v. Hoey, 219
Mich. 643, 189 N.W. 923 (1922). If mutual mistake is a ground for rescission
when the existence of the goods is precarious, breach of warranty of title should
be a ground when the title is precarious.
"Jordan v. Van Duzee, 139 Minn. 103, 165 N.W. 877 (1917); Martin v.
Coffman, 87 Ohio App. 398, 95 N.E.2d 286 (1949).2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-312. Warranty of Title and Against In-
fringement; Buyer's Obligation Against Infringement.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty that
(a) The title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other




The warranty of quiet possession is abolished. Disturbance
of quiet possession, although not mentioned specifically, is one
way, among many, in which the breach of the warranty of title
may be established.
The view advocated in this note, that the warranty of title is violated
when the title conveyed is unsound although the buyer is not yet dis-
turbed by adverse claimants, is adopted in the Code in connection with
a particular situation. The Code specifies that "a seller who is a
merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods
shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by way of
infringement or the like. ... "21 A comment states that "this section
rejects the cases which recognize the principle that infringements violate
the warranty of title, but deny the buyer a remedy unless he has been
expressly prevented from using the goods. Under this Article 'eviction'
is not a necessary condition to the buyer's remedy since the buyer's
remedy arises immediately upon receipt of notice of infringement; it is
mrely one way of establishing the fact of breach." If this be sound law
as to merchants when a title is invalid by reason. of infringements, it
would appear to be sound law generally where the title is invalid by
reason of other infirmities.
BAILEY PATRICK, JR.
Taxation-Depreciation-Useful Life, Salvage Value and. Capital
Gains Under the Declining Amount Depreciation Methods of the
1954 Code
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 authorizes taxpayers in business
to compute a reasonable allowance for depreciation by means of liberal-
ized, declining amount methods in addition to the ordinary straight line
method.1 However, section 167(c) expressly provides that these liberal-
ized methods "shall apply only in the case of property (other than
intangible property) ...with a useful life of 3 years or more .
(Emphasis added.) 2
21 UN FoRm COmmERCiAL CODE § 2-312 (3).
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167. Section 167(b) provides:
For taxable years ending after December 31, 1953, the term "reasonable
allowance" as used in subsection (a) shall include (but shall not be limited to)
an allowance computed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary or his delegate, under any of the following methods:
/ 1 the straight line method,
2) the declining balance method, using a rate not exceeding twice the
rate which would have been used had the annual allowance been computed
under the method described in paragraph (1),
(3) the sum of the years-digits method, and
(4) any other consistent method productive of an annual allowance. . .
Section 167(c) has other limitations on the use of the liberalized methods
of depreciation, not pertinent to this Note, which in effect require that such
1959]
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In Hertz Corp. v. United Statess a recent district court decision, a
thorough analysis was made of some of the most common issues of
depreciation-useful life and salvage value. In 1954, 1955, and 1956,
the taxpayer, an automobile rental agency, had held and used some of its
automobiles an average period of 26 months. The average economic life
of these vehicles for business purposes was four years. On the basis of
this latter period, taxpayer sought to depreciate the vehicles under the
declining balance method. The Commissioner disallowed the use of
this method because the taxpayer had held the vehicles for only 26
months-a period less than the three-year period prescribed by section
167(c). Furthermore, the Commissioner disallowed declining balance
depreciation deductions on trucks, even though the taxpayer had held
the trucks more than three years, contending that taxpayer had taken
depreciation beyond a reasonable salvage value.
4
Taxpayer contended that it was entitled to use the method, urging
that the useful life of the vehicles extended over the entire business life
of four years, regardless of the holding period. Further, taxpayer con-
tended that no salvage value need be estimated and accounted for under
the declining balance method, other than the residual sum inherent
therein.
The specific isgues before the court were: (1) whether it was the
intent of Congress to change the meaning of "useful life" when enacting
the 1954 Code; (2) if so, whether such new definition may be retro-
actively applied from the time of its appearance in the 1956 regulations;
and (3) whether salvage value is inherent in the declining balance
method or must be accounted for as required under the 1956 regulations. 6
The court, after a review of legislative history and pertinent case
law, concluded that taxpayer could not use the declining balance method
for those vehicles held by it for less than three years, because Congress
intended "useful life" to mean the life of the asset in the hands of
taxpayer. However, it was held that the deficiency assessments of the
Commissioner could not be applied retroactively to years before the
promulgation of the asserted regulations of 1956, due to the fact that
the taxpayer was justified in relying upon the Commissioner's acquies-
cence in the meanings of "useful life" and "salvage value" as those as-
serted by the taxpayer. Also, the court allowed the taxpayer to
tangible property shall have been completed or originally acquired after December
31, 1953.
1165 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1958).
'See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-1(a), (c) (1956).
Certified public accountants testified on behalf of the taxpayer that "useful
life" has consistently meant, and still means, the economic life of the asset in
whatever hands; and that the useful life of automobiles used for business purposes
is four years. 165 F. Supp. at 265.
'165 F. Supp. at 266.
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depreciate the qualifying trucks down to the inherent residuum without
accounting for salvage value as defined under the new regulations.7
As the court admitted, the problems raised are not only "interesting
and novel, but also difficult of approach." Perhaps an acceptable ap-
proach would be to show why depreciation assumes greater importance
today than mere accounting procedure, how this importance led to the
problems raised in the principal case, and how the court there deviated
from the purpose of the 1956 regulations in holding salvage value to be
inherent in the declining balance method.
Taken literally, "depreciation" is the converse of "appreciation,"
and means a decrease in value not necessarily due either to use or lapse
of time. Here, the word is used to reflect, not the literal meaning, but
the statutory language, i.e., the amortization of long-term costs by peri-
odic deductions of a "reasonable allowance for ... exhaustion, wear and
tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) .... 9
One authority concludes from an examination of early accounting
literature in England that the idea of depreciation, was recognized at
the time of the American Revolution and related to the assignment of
long-term plant costs to the various accounting periods.10 Today, how-
ever, the concept of "depreciation" has come to mean more than mere
accounting procedure. This is true because of the occurrence of two
events: (1) the steady decline of the dollar's purchasing power, and (2)
the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The former has
induced business to seek a process whereby higher replacement costs can
be anticipated in part from revenues to supplement the inadequate allow-
ances of amortization-more specifically, depreciation. The 1954 Code
appeared to give business such a process by way of the liberalized, de-
clining-amount depreciation methods found under section 167, and the
"On this latter point, both the Commissioner in the past and Congress presently
are in complete agreement, and the intent of Congress being clear, I conclude that
salvage value other than that which is inherent in the method is not a factor
in determining depreciation under the declining balance theory of depreciation."
165 F. Supp. at 275.
6165 F. Supp. at 266.
o INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a). In United States v. Ludley, 274 U.S. 295
(1927), Mr. Justice Brandeis set out the general formula as follows:
"The amount of the allowance for depreciation is that sum which should
be set aside for the taxable year, in order that, at the end of the useful life
of the plant in the business, the aggregate of the sums set aside will (with
salvage value) suffice to provide an amount equal to the original cost." (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 300.
See also Even Realty Co., 1 B.T.A. 355 (1925); 4 MERTs FEDERAL INCOME
TAx § 23.33 (1954).
" In 1764, the following entry was made in an expense report for maintaining
and preserving the canal from Forth to Carron Water: "I suppose in 20 years
time many of the locks will want new gates, all of which will gradually fail in a
few years after. I, therefore, suppose them all made at the end of 20 years and,
therefore, 72 locks at 60 pounds per lock . . . 4,320 pounds." Perry Mason,
Illustrations of the Early Treatment of Depreciation, 8 AccouNTING REv. 209, 210
(1933).
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preferential capital gains treatment afforded certain business assets
under section 1231.1 These declining-amount methods allow the tax-
payer to depreciate high initial costs against present sales so as to reduce
taxable income and thereby gain a temporary advantage.1 2 Probably
the primary purpose of the declining-amount methods is to keep Ameri-
can industry modern by encouraging firms to retire plant assets before
such assets became absolutely obsolete.1, The declining balance method
used by the taxpayer in the principal case was one of these methods.
14
To the tax-conscious taxpayer who could take advantage of the de-
clining-amount methods and the capital gain benefits of section 1231,
an obvious opportunity to avoid taxes by converting ordinary income
into capital gains presented itself. Even with the requirement of a three-
year useful life as a condition precedent to the use of the declining-
amount methods, the taxpayer, assuming that "useful life" was the period
of economic usefulness of the asset, proposed to take the largest deprecia-
tion deductions allowable and then sell the assets after a one or two
year holding period-a period during which the asset would be useful
to him, but less than the economic life of the asset.15 Obviously, since
"I INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 1231. Section 1231 (a) allows capital gain treat-
ment, under specific circumstances, of "recognized gains on sales or exchanges of
property used in trade or business." Section 1231(b) defines the term "property
used in the trade or business." It includes, inter alia, non-inventoriable property
which is held for more than six months and is depreciable under § 167.
12 Most businessmen and accountants agree that the two basic objectives of a
sound depreciation policy are: (1) to incur the lowest possible long-term tax
costs, and (2) to achieve the maximum conservation of working capital. Inasmuch
as depreciation generally does not affect the volume of sales, it is obvious that
any change in working capital must come from the postponement of tax payments.
This is the function of those liberalized methods of depreciation found under §
167(b) of the 1954 Code. Though the tax is merely deferred, a permanent ad-
vantage is derived from the use of the increased working capital. See generally
Reynolds, The Impact of the Choice of Base and Method of Amortization, May
1957 (unpublished thesis in University of North Carolina Main Library).
1' 165 F. Supp. at 272. H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1954),
contains the following:
More liberal depreciation allowances are anticipated to have far-reaching
economic effects. The incentives resulting from the changes are well-timed to
help maintain the present high level of investment in plant and equipment.
The acceleration in the speed of the tax-free recovery of costs is of critical
importance in the decision of management to incur risks. The faster write-off
would increase available working capital and materially aid growing businesses
in the financing of their expansion. For all segments of the American economy,
liberalized depreciation policies should assist modernization and expansion of
industrial capacity, with resulting economic growth, increased production, and
a higher standard of living. Ibid.
1 See note 1 supra.
1" The use of the 200 percent declining balance rate in case of short-lived
properties would result in extremely fast write-offs. For example, in the case
of an asset with a 2 year service life, the doubling of the 50 percent straight
line rate would be equivalent to expensing the cost in the year of acquisition.
These properties would. retain substantial value and could be resold subject
to capital gains rates.
To prevent unrealistic deductions and resulting tax avoidances, your com-
mittee has provided that the liberalized methods be made available only with
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"useful life" was assumed to be the entire business life of the asset,
"salvage value" was understood to be that residual or scrap value re-
maining after the business life was exhausted; and the taxpayer only
accounted for salvage value in this manner, if at all.16 Thus, in view of
the relatively high market demand for used assets and the rapid de-
preciation of initial cost, it can be seen that these assets brought a'price
substantially higher than scrap value. The taxpayer obtained 1231
treatment on the gains realized,1 7 causing revenue losses which the
Treasury sought to combat by various methods.
These methods of attack by the Treasury were basically as follows:
(1) asserting that the assets sold by taxpayer were items of inventory,
and therefore not qualified for capital gain treatment under section 1231;
(2) seeking to readjust useful life and salvage value, either by lengthen-
ing useful life so as to reduce the depreciation rate per annum or by
increasing salvage value so as to reduce the amount of depreciation
allowable; or (3) asserting that "useful life" was meant to be that
period during which the asset was in the hands of the individual tax-
payer, and "salvage value" to be the estimated value of the asset at
time of disposition. It was on the basis of this third method that the
1956 regulations sought to prevent the tax avoidances and resulting
revenue losses mentioned.
respect to assets with iteful lives of 3 or more years. (Emphasis added.)
S. REp. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1954).
1' Koelling v. United States, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9453 (E.D. Neb. 1957) ; 4
MERTENS FEDRaA. INCOME TAX § 23.28 (1954) ("as a matter of practice salvage
value is sometimes ignored").
17 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1221, 1231.
To illustrate this idea assume that an automobile agency starts business in
1954 with 200 cars costing $300,000. If it depreciates these cars on a three-year
basis and takes 663% depreciation in the first year (twice the straight line rate)
as allowed under the Code, its depreciation expense in 1954 would be $200,000.
Assuming revenue of $500,000 and expenses other than depreciation of $300,000,
net taxable income would be zero. Then suppose that the cars are sold at the end
of the first year for $200,000; there would be a capital gain of $100,000. The
total tax would be only $25,000. Comparatively, if the straight line method
were followed, there would be, under the same facts, $125,000 ordinary income.
The tax bill on this income at the corporate tax rate would be $59,500. The fol-
lowing schedule illustrates the difference:
DECLINING STRAIGHT
CORPORATE PROFIT AND Loss BALANCE LINE
Ordinary Income $500,000 $500,000
Expenses:
Depreciation (*adjusted for salvage value) $200,000 $ 75,000*
Other 300,000 300,000
Total $500,000 $375,000
Taxable Ordinary Income -0- $125,000
Tax on Ordinary Income (corporate rates) -0- $ 59,500
Capital Gains $100,000 -0-
Tax on Capital Gains (25%) $ 25,000 -0-
Total Tax $25,000 $ 59,500
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In Philber Equipment Co. v. Commissioner,18 new automobiles were
leased for one or two years to taxpayer's customers and then sold upon
termination of the leases. The Commissioner contended that the auto-
mobiles were inventoriable goods held principally for sale to the cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of business and, therefore, that the gains
received from the sales could not qualify for capital gain treatment under
section 1231. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the lower
court in favor of the Commissioner upon the theory that the acquisition,
use, and disposition of the vehicles were consistent with the business
purpose of vehicle rentals. It was held that the gains from the sale of
such assets qualified for 1231 treatment.19
In Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,20 the taxpayer was depreciating its
tractors over a period of four years, and its trailers over a period of
five years. These vehicles were disposed of after average holding periods
of 33 and 38 months, respectively. The Commissioner contended that
the useful lives of the assets were being understated by the taxpayer
because it (taxpayer) was receiving amounts upon disposition of the
assets greatly in excess of their adjusted bases at time of sale. The
Commissioner determined tax deficiencies computed on the basis of a
useful life of five years for the tractors and six years for the trailers.
The court held that the useful lives were correctly stated by the taxpayer.
The Commissioner was not allowed to assert an understatement of
salvage value because the issue had not been framed in his pleadings;
but since salvage value cannot be redetermined unless useful life is also
redetermined,21 the omission probably did not weaken the Commis-
sioner's case.
It can be seen that in seeking to prevent the taxpayer from realizing
a substantial capital gain in the Pilot case and in seeking to prevent
taxpayer from obtaining capital gain treatment altogether under section
1231 in the Philber case, the Commissioner was taking inconsistent posi-
tions. In the Pilot case, the Commissioner was seeking to prevent a
capital gain by extending the useful lives of the assets beyond those
periods estimated by the taxpayer. In the Philber case, the Commis-
18 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1956).
"'Accord, Davidson v. Tomlinson, 165 F. Supp. 455 (S.D. Fla. 1958) ; Lynch-
Davidson Motors, Inc. v. Tomlinson, CCH 1958 STAND FED. TAX REP. ff 9738.
Taxpayer, an auto dealer, was held entitled to depreciation and capital gains
treatment on various cars and trucks that were set aside from its used car business
and used for company purposes. They were not properly includible in inventory
since they were not held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business.
20 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 195 (1956).21Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(c) provides in part:
[S]alvage value shall not be changed at any time after the determination
made at the time of acquisition merely because of changes in price levels.
However, if there is a redetermination of useful life under the rules of
paragraph (b), salvage value may be redetermined based upon facts known
at the time of such redetermination of useful life.
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sioner was apparently acquiescing in the useful lives of the assets, and
allowing the gains realized, but asserting that such gains could not
qualify for capital gain treatment.2 2 These positions of the Commissioner
were also inconsistent with his later position based on the 1956 Regula-
tions where he sought to prevent the realization of a 1231 gain on
the sale of such assets by defining "useful life" as that period during
which the asset was used by the individual taxpayer and not as the
business life of the asset.
Before the appearance of the 1956 Regulations, the taxpayer relied
on the business community's definitions of the concepts of "useful life"
and "salvage value."' 23  Such reliance appeared justified since Congress,
while recognizing the need for such concepts, has never announced an
official explanation of either term.2 4  The courts apparently construed
the terms in the same manner as did the taxpayer; and the Commis-
sioner, as illustrated by such cases as Pilot,25 acquiesced in the com-
munity-developed meanings, viz., just as "useful life" was considered
that period for which the asset was functionally usable, "salvage value"
was understood to mean that residual or scrap value which naturally
remained after the asset was physically exhausted. Probably the most
affirmative position towards definition taken by the Treasury, before
the 1956 regulations, appeared in Bulletin "F." There the government
listed such factors as wear and tear, decay or decline from natural causes,
and "various forms of obsolescence attributable to the art, economic
changes, inventions, and inadequacy to the growing needs of the trade
or business" as important in the determination of the useful life of
" This contention of the Commissioner is clearly inconsistent with congressional
intent as manifested by § 1231(b), expressly providing for capital gain treatment
of certain depreciable assets. See note 11 supra. Cf. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954,§ 179 (added by Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 204), where businesses(not including trusts) may elect to write off 20% of the cost of tangible personal
property in the year of acquisition, it addition, to the regular depreciation
on the balance. However, this additional 20% allowance is limited to tangible
assets with a remaining useful life of at least 6 years.
"See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
"'Although the terms were not given definition, the Treasury has utilized them
from an early date. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 161 (1919) provided: "A reasonable
allowance for depreciation is that amount which should be set aside for the
taxable year [so that] . . .the aggregate of such amounts for the useful life of
the property in the business will suffice, with the salvage value, at the end of such
useful life to provide in place of the property its cost. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Article 165 of the same regulation provided that the "capital sum to be replaced
should be charged off over the useful life of the property." See also Treas. Reg.
118, § 39.23(l)-1 (1953) ; Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(l)-1 (1942).
": See also Dorothy Caruso, 23 T.C. 836 (1955) ; Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co.,
9 T.C. 990 (1947), rev'd on other grounds, 173 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Norris
Lumber Co., 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 728 (1948); General Sec., Inc., 11 P-H
B.T.A. Mem. 219 (1942), aff'd per curiam, 137 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1943) (taxpayer
used cars for one or two years-depreciation allowed on basis of three-year
useful life); Terminal Realty Corp., 32 B.T.A. 623 (1935) ; American Refrigerator
Transit Co., 31 B.T.A. 465 (1934); Merkle Broom Co., 3 B.T.A. 1084 (1926)(automobiles exchanged within two years of purchase; court held that the proper
rate of depreciation was 25%, over a four year period).
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property in the trade or business. But nowhere in the Bulletin appear
definitions of "useful life" and "salvage value." 26 The taxpayer, there-
fore, established depreciation policies based upon the accelerated methods
of depreciation when they first became available under Section 167(b) of
the 1954 Code, and in some instances, since it was understood that
"useful life" meant the economic life of the assets, these methods were
also applied to assets that were held for less than three years by the
taxpayer.
Probably the first public notice of the coming change in the defini-
tions of "useful life" and "salvage value" appeared when the Assistant
to the Secretary of the Treasury, Laurens Williams, submitted a letter
to Representative Thomas B. Curtis of Missouri. This letter appeared
in the Congressional Record on June 16, 1955, and stressed the defini-
tions of "useful life" and "salvage value" as they were to later appear
in the new Regulations. The following is an excerpt from that letter:
[U] seful life ... is not the full, normally inherent useful life
of the property. It is rather, the useful life of the property de-
termined in accordance with the practice of the particular taxpayer
in his trade or business or in the production of income. If a tax-
payer has no consistent practice regarding the disposition of
depreciable property, the estimated useful life of his depreciable
assets should be determined in the light of experience in the
taxpayer's business or industry. (Emphasis added.)27
Then, in 1956, the Treasury Regulations were issued defining
"useful life" and "salvage value." The relevant depreciation provisions,
set forth in section 1.167(a)-i, state that a reasonable allowance (for
depreciation) is "that amount which should be set aside for the taxable
year in accordance with a reasonably consistent plan, so that the aggre-
gate of the amounts set aside, plus the salvage value, will, at the end of
the estimated useful life of the depreciable property, equal the cost or
other basis of the property . . . . An asset shall not be depreciated
below a reasonable salvage value under any method of computing de-
preciation .... The allowance shall not reflect amounts representing
a mere reduction in market value." (Emphasis added.)
Section 1.167(a)-l(b) provides that the useful life "is the period
over which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to the
taxpayer in his trade or business ... ." And, finally, section 1.167(a) -
218NT. REv. BULL. "F" (1920, rev. 1942), contained such information and
statistical data as then constituted the best available indication of Internal Revenue
practice and the trend of official opinion in the administration of the pertinent
provision relating to determination of deductions for depreciation and obsolescence.
The text was revoked in part by Rev. Rul. 90, 91, 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 43, 44,
in which the IRS announced its general policy, still in effect, not to disturb
depreciation deductions, and to propose adjustments only where there was a clear
and convincing basis for a change. In 1955, the IRS announced that the remainder
of the text was revoked. 1955-8 Cum. BULL. 53.27101 CONG. REc. 8570 (1955).
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1 (c) provides that "salvage value is the amount (determined at time of
acquisition) which is estimated will be realizable upon sale or other
disposition of an asset when it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's trade
or business . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Obviously this change in policy was not well received by such tax-
payers as the plaintiff in the Hertz case. They argued that the 1956
Regulations were not in accord with the intent of Congress, 28 that
Congress understood the former definitions to be correct and con-
templated the continued use of such former meanings, and that any
change in these meanings would be a change in policy, requiring Con-
gressional action.2 9  On the other hand, the government argued that
Congress left such definitive action to the Treasury under its inter-
pretative powers, that the new regulations merely defined "useful life"
and "salvage value" in more detail, and that there was actually no change
in their definitions.3 0
The courts in the few cases decided under the 1956 Regulations
seemed to uphold the authority of the Treasury to make such definitions,
but took a modified position as to when the definitions were to become
effective. This was because the statute of limitations had not run on the
taxable years for which the Commissioner was seeking to assess de-
ficiencies, and because the Commissioner had taken inconsistent positions
before the 1956 Regulations and had long acquiesced in the practike
followed by the taxpayer.3 ' Courts generally do not favor retroactive
laws,82 nor the retroactive application of administrative regulations in-
" In Hertz, the court referred to extensive revenue hearings held by Congress
during which the Treasury submitted reports to the Ways and Means Committee
and the Senate Finance Committee warning against revenue losses through the
benefits of capital gains treatment of profits from the sale of assets subject to
accelerated depreciation. Also, when Congress limited the taking of capital gains
in connection with the rapid amortization of emergency facilities, it did not see
fit to limit capital gains upon the sale of assets used in the trade or business.
165 F. Supp. at 273. See H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1954);
S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1954) ; cf., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§
168, 1238.
" "While it is true that a regulation by a department of Government addressed
to and reasonably adapted to the enforcement of an Act of Congress, the adminis-
tration of which is confided to such department, has the force and effect of law
if it be not in conflict with express statutory provision, yet the power to enact
regulations is not power to alter the law and the regulations have no power to
amend or change existing statutory provisions." St. Louis Co. v. United States;
134 F. Supp. 411, 414 (D. Del. 1955).
o The Commissioner's argument could be supported by the fact that Congress
set up a standard of "reasonable allowance for depreciation." Thus, it would not
be a delegation of legislative power to permit the Treasury, a legislative agency,
to make rules that best define what is reasonable. Maryland Cas. Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920).
"Evans v. Commissioner, CCH 1959 STAND. FED. TAX REp. (59-1 U.S. Tax
Cas.) f 9208 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 1959), reversing and remanding 26 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 156 (1957); Hertz v. Commissioner, 165 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1958);
Koelling v. United States, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9453 (E.D. Neb. 1957).
"Nichols v. Collidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927); Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529
(1922).
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terpreting laws in such a manner as to be inconsistent with prior prac-
tice.38
In the recent case of Evans v. Commissioner,3 4 the Commissioner
asserted the new Regulations as he did in the principal case. The
taxpayer was in the auto-leasing business. During the taxable years
of 1951 and 1952, taxpayer leased all of his automobiles through a
corporation owned by his son. The leased vehicles were returned to
taxpayer at the termination of the leases, usually within 15 months of
their original purchase, and then were immediately sold. The vehicles
were to be depreciated on the basis of a four-year useful life period
and taxpayer made no provision for salvage value. The Commissioner
redetermined the depreciation on the basis of a useful life of 17 months
and a salvage value of $1,325 for each vehicle, using as authority sub-
sections 1.167(a)-l(b) and 1.167(a)-1(c) of the new regulations. 5
The Tax Court held that "the automobiles which it (taxpayer) leased
to U-Drive, Inc. for short-term, had a useful life of 15 months and a
salvage value of $1,375."'36 Upon appeal by the taxpayer, the court of
appeals reversed because the regulations asserted by the Commissioner
and upheld by the Tax Court had been retroactively applied. The court
relied on the Hertz case where it was stated:
[T]axpayers had a right to file their returns in reliance upon
the Commissioner's long-continued interpretation of his own
regulations. Here a new regulation has been promulgated defining
the term 'useful life' pursuant to a statute which for the first time
has employed the term and where the intention of Congress is
clearly contrary to the interpretation, as evidenced by conduct
and frequent pronouncements, which the Commissioner has given
it in the past. Common justice requires it be given a prospective
construction only. (Emphasis added.)3'
The court implied that the new regulations would be given effect
prospectively 3
"Woodworth v. Kales, 26 F.2d 178 (1928); cf. Gasper v. Commissioner,
225 F.2d 284 (1955).
Evans v. Commissioner, supra note 31.
In the notice of deficiency directed to the petitioner, the Commissioner stated:
"It has been determined that the average useful life of the automobiles used in
your business based on your actual experience was not in excess of seventeen
months and the average salvage value of said automobiles at the end of their
useful life in your business was not less than $1,325 ... " (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 71, 399.
It is interesting to note that the Commissioner abandoned his contention
that the taxpayer should not be allowed to treat the income from the sales as
capital gain. As to this, the court remarked: "The Commissioner's abandonment
of this approach was probably influenced by the decision of Philber Equipment
Corp. v. Commissioner." Ibid.
CCH 1959 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 1 9208 at 71, 392.
165 F. Supp. at 275.





It appears reasonable to predict from Philber, and other more recent
cases dealing with similar facts,39 that any substantial gains realized
by way of extraordinary circumstances from the sale of depreciable
assets will be afforded capital gain treatment under section 1231, but
that such gains will no longer be obtainable through a depreciation policy
based upon the economic life of the asset because of the new definitions
found under the 1956 Regulations. However, it seems clear from the
principal case and the Evans case that the new regulations shall not be
applied retroactively to years before their promulgation. The taxpayer,
relying on the long-continued practice and position of the Commissioner
in measuring useful life by the physical or economic life of the de-
precable asset, cannot be retroactively assessed for an overstatement
of depreciation based on the functional life of the asset.
In all probability, the taxpayer must look for a prospective applica-
tion of "useful life" to mean the life of the asset in the taxpayer's indi-
vidual trade or business. "Salvage value" will mean the estimated value
of the asset to be realized at the time of its disposition.
However, it should be noted that, under the holding of the principal
case, the taxpayer using the declining balance method need not account
for salvage value as the estimated realizable value of the asset at time
of disposition. The effect of such a holding, upon close analysis, is that
a capital gain concession results in favor of the taxpayer using the de-
clining balance method which is not available to taxpayers using any of
the other methods of depreciation allowed by the Code.40  This is be-
cause, under all other methods, salvage value must be deducted before
arriving at depreciable basis.41 Thus, under the other methods, the only
capital gain possible is the difference between the estimated value and
the price actually realized.
For illustrative purposes, assume that two taxpayers each acquire
an asset at the cost of $3,000, intending to use it in the business for a
period of four years. Taxpayer A uses the declining balance method.
Taxpayer B uses the straight line method (any other method could also
"9 See note 19 srupra.
"0 See note 1 supra. Such concession is based on the assumption that taxpayer
holds the asset for more than the three years required by section 167(c), but less
than the full business life, so that a substantial disparity will result between the
price at time of disposition (salvage value, under the new regulations) and the
inherent residual balance, the former exceeding the latter.
'Tres. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(c) (1956) provides that "salvage value must be
taken into account in determining the depreciation deduction either by a reduction
of the amount subject to depreciation, or by a reduction in the rate of deprecia-
tion.... See, however, section 1.167(b)-2(a) for the treatment of salvage under
the declining balance method."
Treas. Reg. 1.167(b)-2(a) provides that "while salvage value is not taken into
account in determining the annual allowances under this method, in no event
shall an asset (or an account) be depreciated below a reasonable salvage value."
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apply here). Both expect to sell the asset at the end of the four-year
period for an estimated price of $1,000. Assume, further, that the new
concepts of "useful life" and "salvage value" under the 1956 Regulations
are in effect, and that the principal case is available for precedent. Tax-
payer A, by using the declining balance method, need not account for
salvage value in arriving at his depreciable basis; taxpayer B must
subtract his salvage value ($1,000) in arriving at the depreciable basis
of his asset.













Basis at Time of Sale (cost less deprn.)
Selling Price (after 4 yr period)
Long Term Capital Gain
Tax at 25% (maximum)
Net Gain After Taxes
add Recovery on Remaining Basis
add Recovery via Depreciation Deductions
Total Recovery on Investment
deduct Original Investment










































$ 609.37 $ -0-
Thus, taxpayer A, entitled to use the declining balance method be-
cause the useful life of the asset in his hands met the three-year condi-
tion imposed by section 167(c), was able to compensate for the declining
purchasing power of the dollar by recoupment of more than the original
cost of the asset and provide funds to meet the expected higher replace-
ment cost of another asset.42 Under the holding of the principal case,
taxpayer A is allowed to depreciate beyond the estimated value at time
of disposition (salvage value, under the new regulations) down to the
" See note 11 supra.
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inherent residual value at the end of the useful life.43  In all probabili-
ty, this residual value will be a great deal smaller than the estimated
value at the time of disposition; especially where the useful life is relative-
ly short so that general obsolescence does not come into play to any
appreciable degree.
Taxpayer B, having to estimate a reasonable salvage value as the
expected price for the asset upon disposition, was confined to realize
only the return of his original investment; and the increased cost of his
replacement must be obtained from retained earnings or future income,
after taxes at the ordinary rate. He gets no concession from the use
of section 1231 other than those incidental capital gains which might
result from the difference between estimated and actual salvage value.
Assuming that the inherent salvage value in the declining balance
method is a "reasonable salvage value," it is obvious from the illustration,
supra, that business will find it more lucrative to maintain a depreciation
policy based on this method. The probable consequence is a mass
exodus by industry from the other depreciation methods and a shift to
the declining balance method.
That this is obviously not what Congress intended is evidenced by
the fact that other methods were enacted without any indication of dis-
crimination in favor of the declining balance method.4 4 It may well be
that Congress intended to grant taxpayers in industry extra benefits
through the use of the accelerated depreciation methods; but to grant
the concession allowed by the court in the principal case only to the
declining balance method would result in the relative obsolescence of
the other methods allowed under section 167(h) of the 1954 Code.
It is submitted that the Hertz case will not be followed on its specific
holding that salvage value is inherent in the declining balance method
and that the taxpayer need not cease depreciation at the point where the
depreciated basis reaches the estimated value of the asset at the time of
disposition. 45 It seems likely that the provisions of the new regulations
relating to the definitions of "useful life" and "salvage value" will be
upheld in toto, limited only by the requirement that they be given
prospective effect. JOSEPH B. ALALA, JR.
"That the court found such residual sum to be a "reasonable salvage value,"
although not clearly so stated, may be inferred from two facts. First, the issue
of "reasonable salvage value!' was asserted by the Commissioner; and, second, the
court nevertheless decided in favor of the taxpayer. 165 F. Supp. at 274.
"See note 2 supra.
"It is possible that other courts, by a "stretch of the legal imagination,"
could construe this latter holding to mean that although the taxpayer does not
have to account for salvage value other than that inherent in the method, he will
have to stop the depredation process upon reaching an adjusted basis equal to the
estimated value of the asset at time of disposition. This is what section 1.167(b)-
2(a) of the 1956 Regulations requires. Since the Commissioner was asserting
this very section, it would appear difficult for the courts to give such construction
to the holding.
1959]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Workmen's Compensation-Latent Injuries and the Period
of Limitations on Filing Claims
When it is undisputed that an industrial accident arising out of and
in the course of employment proximately results in a disabling injury,
and the claim for compensation is filed within a reasonable time after
the disability, few would doubt that an award favorable to the claimant
should issue. Where the injury is latent or progressive, however, and
does not manifest itself until long after the accident, an otherwise
meritorious claim may be denied under a provision like G.S. § 97-24(a)
which forever bars the right to compensation unless a claim is filed with
the Industral Commission within two years after the accident.' In
Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co.,2 for example, a case involving the old one
year limitation period, the claimant was involved in an apparently trivial
accident and sustained a very slight injury to his right eye by a flying
sliver of metal. The incident was reported to the employer promptly,
but no claim for compensation was made as the employee returned to
the job almost immediately. Some eighteen months later, however, a
cataract developed in the right eye and the claimant totally lost the
sight of the eye. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
employee's failure to file claim within one year after the accident forever
barred his right to compensation.3 In other words, the limitation period
began running on the date of the accident against a claim which had
not at that time matured, and when the claim did mature some eighteen
months later, it was held to be already barred.
A result more in keeping with the remedial purposes of workmen's
compensation legislation is possible, indeed, is usual, where the limitation
period is dated not from the time of the accident, but from the time of
the injury.4  In Hughes v. Industrial Comn'n,5 where the seemingly
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24(a) (1958) provides: "The right to compensation
under this article shall be forever barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial
Commission within two years after the accident, and if death results from the
accident, unless a claim be filed with the Commission within one year thereafter."
(The 1955 amendment enlarged the period for filing claims from one to two years.)
2228 N.C. 447, 46 S.E.2d 109 (1948). The Whitted case distinguished
Hardison v. Hampton, 203 N.C. 187, 165 S.E. 355 (1932) which had held that
Form No. 19, to be filed with the Commission by the employer upon the occurrence
or knowledge of an injury, constituted a "claim" within the intendment of G.S.§ 97-24(a). At the time of the Whitted decision, however, Form No. 19 had been
amended and contained a statement on its face that it was filed in compliance
with G.S. § 97-92 only and was not the employee's claim for compensation. See
Lilly v. Belk Bros., 210 N.C. 735, 188 S.E. 319 (1936).
'Accord, Wilson v. Border Queen Kitchen Cabinet Co., 221 Ark. 580, 254
S.W.2d 682 (1953); Gavigan v. Visiting Nurse's Ass'n, 125 Conn. 290, 4 A.2d
923 (1939) ; Rutledge v. Sanders, 181 Kan. 369, 310 P.2d 950 (1957).
'The "accident" contemplated by workmen's compensation legislation is any
untoward event which results in some injury to the workman. It should be pointed
out that in any accident giving rise to a right to workmen's compensation there
will always be some traumatic or "injuring" effect at the precise moment of the
accident although the employee may be unaware of it. It is the premise of this
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trivial accident occurred in December, 1953, it was not until October,
1954 that "traumatic sinovitis, left wrist" was discovered. Claim for
compensation was made more than twenty-one months after the accident.
The Arizona court, while holding the claim timely as against a one
year period of limitation which ran from the time of the injury, said that
the employee could not have been expected to make a claim for com-
pensation at the time of the accident, for the injury was not then com-
pensable, and that consequently the statute of limitations did not begin
to run until the injury became manifest. 6
Summarization of the statutes, in respect to their claim period dates,
is difficult because of considerable variety and rather frequent amend-
ment. However, it appears that of the some fifty workmen's compensa-
tion statutes in effect in this country at least twenty-six clearly date the
claim period from the time of the "accident. ' 7  Most of the remaining
Note, however, that when the injury is latent and its full extent is essentially
unknowable until some time after the accident that produced it, the statute of
limitations should not begin to run until the employee knows or has reason to
know that he suffers from a compensable injury.
81 Ariz. 264, 304 P.2d 1066 (1956).
'Accord, Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 43 Ariz. 50, 29
P.2d 142 (1934) (cancer developed more than two years after the accident);
Acme Body Works v. Koepsel, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756 (1931) (cataract
resulted more than six years after the accident).7 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 296 (1940) (claim must be filed within one year from
the time of the accident) ; ARx. STAT. § 81-1318 (Supp. 1957) (two years from
the date of the accident; formerly -an from the date of the "injury" but amended
in 1948) ; CAL. LAB. CODE § 5405 (one year from the date of the "injury," but §
5411 defines the date of the "injury" as the date of the "accident") ; COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 81-13-5 (1954) (six months after the injury, but § 81-13-6 provides
that any disability beginning more than five years after the accident is conclusively
presumed not to be due to the accident; the latter section has been held to be a
rule of evidence and not a 'statute of limitations. Industrial Comm'n v. Weaver,
81 Colo. 191, 254 Pac. 444 (1927)); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-168 (1958) (one
year from the date of the accident) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2361 (Supp.
1958) (two years from the accident); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-305 (1956)(one year after the accident); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-402 (1949) (one year
after the date of the accident); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 161 (Smith-Hurd 1950)
(six months after the accident) ; Im. ANN. STAT. § 40-1224 (1952) (two years
after the "occurrence of the accident"; formerly two years after the injury,
but amended in 1947); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-520a (Supp. 1955)(120 days after the accident); Ky. REv. STAT. § 342.185 (1959) (one year
from the date of the accident); ME. Rrv. STAT. ANN. ch. 31, § 33 (Supp. 1957)
(in no event to exceed two years from the date of the accident) ; Mn. ANN.
CODE art. 101, § 39 (1957) (sixty days after the date of the "accidental injury,"
but an amendment in 1957 provides that unless claim is made within eighteen
months "from the date of the accident" the claim is completely barred) ; MiNN.
STAT. ANr. . 176.151 (Supp. 1958) (not to exceed six years from the date of the
accident); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 92-601 (1949) (twelve months from the
date of the "happening of the accident") ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 281:16 (Supp.
1957) (ninety days from the occurrence of the accident); N.J. REv. STAT. .
34:15-51 (1959) (two years after the accident); N.M. STAT. ANN. . 59-10-74
(Supp. 1957) (one year after the accident "causing injury") ; N.Y. WORxME-N'S
ComP. LAW § 28 (two years after the accident); N.C. GEN. STAT. . 97-24(a)(1958) (two years after the accident): ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.274 (1955) (not
later than one year after the accident): PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77. . 602 (Supp.
1957) (sixteen months after the accident) ; S.C, CODE § 72-303 (1952) (one year
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twenty-four date it from the time of the "injury.", In at least one of
the "accident" type statutes9 there are provisions which soften the
effect somewhat in the case of latent or inherently unknowable injury
caused by accident. Massachusetts,'" Texas," and Nevada 12 appear at
first glance to have "accident" type statutes using the accident as a
beginning point for the limitation period; but in each statute there
are such broad grounds of excuse for "good cause," "mistake," and the
like, that they are for all practical purposes in accord with the better
rule that dates the limitation period from the time of the "injury."13
Although there has been some legislative amendment equating "injury"
with "accident,"' 14 and, indeed, some successful judicial activity to that
effect even under an "injury" type statute,15 there would appear to be
after the accident); UTAHI CODE ANN. § 35-1-99 (1953) (three years from the
date of the accident); VA. CODE ANN. § 65-84 (1950) (one year after the ac-
cident) ; Wis. STAT. § 102.01(2) (1957) (limitation period starts on "date of the
injury," but "date of the injury" is defined as the "date of the accident"). It
should be pointed out that these provi-ions relate only to claims for accidental
injury. If the claim is based on accidental death the limitation periods invariably
begin on the death and not at the time of the accident.
A=z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1061 (1956) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.19 (1952);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 85-26 (1949) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.165 (Supp. 1957) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 6998-18 (1952) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.430 (1949) ; N.D. Rlv. CODE§ 65-0501 (1943); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.84 (1953) OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 85, § 43 (1951); MI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-35-57 (1956) (two years after
the "occurrence or manifestation of the injury"); S.D. CODE § 64.0611 (1939)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1003 (1955); WASH. REv. CODE § 51.28.050 (1952);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2540 (1955) ; Wyo. Coup. STAT. ANN. § 72-160 (Supp. 1957).
' LA. REv. STAT. § 23:1209 (1950): "[W]here the injury does not result at
the time of, or develop immediately after the accident, the limitation shall not take
effect until the expiration of one year from the time the injury develops, but in all
such cases the claim for payment shall be forever barred unless the proceedings
have been begun within tvo years from the date of the accident." Despite the
provision for latent injuries, the claim still must be filed Within two years after
the date of the accident. See MALONE, LA. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 77(Supp. 1955).
0 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 49 (1957) provides that failure to make claim
Within the prescribed six months after the "occurrence of the injury" will not
bar proceedings for compensation if the late filing was occasioned by "mistake
or other reasonable cause, or if it is found that the insurer was not prejudiced by
the delay."
I TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1956) provides in part: "For
good cause, the Board may, in meritorious cases, waive the strict compliance with
the foregoing limitations as to notice, and the filing of claims before the Board."
1NEv. Rrv. STAT. § 616.500(6) (1957) also allows the Nevada Industrial
Commission to waive the strict claim requirement where "for some sufficient
reason" the claim could not have been made.122 LARSEN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 78.42(a) (1952).
" CAL. LAB. CODE § 5411 provides: "The date of the injury, except in cases of
occupational disease, is that date during the employment on which occurred the
alleged incident or exposure, for the consequences of which compensation is
laimed." Similarly, Wis. STAT. § 102.01(2) (1957) defines the "date of the
injury as th date ofteacdn. 
Sent 
rpa
T -Graham v. a5. W.; Wells Brick Co., 150 Tenn. 60 26 SW. 770 (1924).The court stated that " While the terms ' acc ident' and 'ij ury are not synonymous,
the accident produced the injury and inpoint of time they w ere concurrent. ETihe
legisla t a t'ture t. u tti .. fxed he date of the inj r a  the date of te accident and not at
some remote time thereafter when the injured employee became definitely satisfied
that he was disabled as a result of the accident." 150 Tenn. at 667, 266 S.W. at
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overwhelming judicial agreement that under a limitation period dating
from the time of the "injury" no claim for compensation- arises until the
injury results in disability, or in some other overt manner becomes ap-
parent to the claimant. 16
It is submitted that the harsh result indicated under an "accident"
type statute like North Carolina's is the product of a failure to keep in
mind the benevolent purposes of workmen's compensation legislation,
and to a reluctance to interpret the "claim" for compensation in latent
injury cases so as to effectuate those purposes. To say that the limita-
tion period begins to run from the time of the "accident" and not from
the time of some compensable injury is to say in those cases where the
accident and the injury are not coeval that it begins to run before a claim
or a cause of action has really accrued.17 In common law negligence
cases, of course, the cause of action for damages for personal injuries
accrues from the time the negligence operates harmfully on the plaintiff,
that is, at the time of the accident, and usually the plaintiff's knowledge
that any of his rights have been violated is deemed immaterial.' 8 But
in workmen's compensation the right to compensation is predicated not
on negligence but on the sound policy that the expense of industrial
injury, however faultlessly incurred, should be distributed to the public
772. The case in effect was overruled, however, in Ogle v. Tenn, Eastman Corp.,
185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909 (1947) and it may be safely said that today
Tennessee is an "injury" jurisdiction. An interesting example of judicial vacilla-
tion on the "accident" versus "injUry" problem is to be found in the Oklahoma
cases. In Brown & Root, Inc. v. Dunkelberger, 196 Okla. 116, 162 P.2d 1018(1945), the Oklahoma court had held that the statute of limitations did not begin
to run against the filing of a claim for compensation until the disability arising
from the injury became apparent to the employee. Three years later, however,
in Tulsa Hotel v. Sparks, 200 Okla. 636, 198 P.2d 652 (1948) the Oklahoma
court adopted a strict construction policy and in effect overruled the salutary
holding of the Dunkelberger case.
" Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657 (1937).
This decision reversed a line of cases based on Utah Consol. Mining Co. v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 279, 194 Pac. 657 (1920), which had applied a general
statute of limitations and dated it from the accident. (Regrettably, however,
the sound holding of the Salt Lake City case is now itself legislatively overruled
by an amendment to the Utah compensation statute which dates the period from
the time of the accident. UTAr CODE ANN. § 35-1-99 (1953). Applying the new
amendment, the Utah court in McKee v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 550, 206
•P.2d 715 (1949) said that the claimant's right to compensation was forever barred
notwithstanding the fact that he obtained no competent medical diagnosis of
his work-caused injury until three years after the accident and had no knowledge
of his latent condition until that time.)
17 Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, note 16 supra, at 513, 74 P.2d at 658.
18 Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957) ; Butler v. Bell, 181
N.C. 85, 106 S.E. 217 (1921). But see Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628,
86 S.E.2d 649 (1955), to the effect that the general rule in negligence cases that
the cause of action accrues and that the statute of limitations runs from the
moment of injurious impact should not apply to that type of negligence case
involving inherently unknowable harm. The Georgia court said that in such a
case the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the plaintiff had reason
to know he had a cause of action. Cf. Bradt v. United States, 221 F.2d 325 (2d
Cir. 1955).
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as a cost of production.19 Consequently, the negligence rules are in-
applicable to workmen's compensation legislation. As the Utah court
said in Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n :20
The compensation act . . . imposes a duty on employers to
pay compensation to employees who suffer disability or loss from
an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of employ-
ment. Not until there is an accident and injury and disability or
loss from the injury does the duty to pay arise. A mere accident
does not impose the duty to pay. Accident plus injury therefrom
does not impose the duty to pay. But accident plus injury which
results in disability or loss gives rise to the duty to pay.
(Emphasis added. )
To be compared with the Utah court's cogent analysis of the nature
of a claim for compensation made in an "injury" jurisdiction is that of
the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Lewis v. Carnegie-
Illinois Steel Corp.21 There a solution of muriatic acid and water was
accidentally splashed into the employee's eye, but no serious injury
or disability resulted until more than four years later when the claimant
lost the sight of the eye as a direct result of the original accident.
Applying a one year period of limitation dating from the time of the
accident, and holding the claim barred, the court made this curious
statement:
A claim for personal injury arises simultaneously and is
complete with the happening of the accident .... The statutory
limitation .. . applies to the cause of action (the splashing of
muriatic acid into the left eye) and not to the extent of the injury
(the loss of sight of that eye) .22
It would doubtless come as a surprise to many workmen and em-
ployers in Pennsylvania to learn that upon the occurrence of any accident
in the course of employment, however minor and however devoid of
any disabling injury, there should exist a "cause of action" for work-
men's compensation. The effect of such a strict interpretation of the
limitation period for filing claims is to lift the latent injury case out of
a statute that was intended to compensate workmen for injuries re-
sulting in a loss of wages and to protect the public from the expense of
providing for their care.23
The latent injury, traceable to a specific traumatic event which is
isolable in point of time, is factually distinguishable from the similarly
troublesome occupational disease which results slowly over a relatively
19 Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co.. 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 178 (1951).20 93 Utah 510, 513, 74 P.2d 657, 658 (1937).
'1 159 Pa. Super. 226, 48 A.2d 120 (1946).
2 Id. at 228, 48 A.2d at 121.
2' Baltimore Steel Co. v. Burch, 187 Md. 209, 49 A.2d 542 (1946).
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long period of time because of repeated exposure to a particular hazard.24
The factual distinction is exemplified in the hernia cases. If the hernia
follows as a result of a single definite "accident" it is an "accidental
hernia," whereas if it develops as a result of certain types of lifting over
a long period of time it may be an "occupational hernia." But aside
from the factual difference, there would seem to be little difference in
legal principle. The Maryland court,25 in construing a "date of the
disability" limitation provision applicable both to occupational diseases
and to accidental injuries, said that in the case of occupational disease the
statute of limitations would begin to run "from the time the employee
...knew or had reason to believe that he was suffering from an oc-
cupational disease and that there was a causal connection between his
disability and occupation."2 6  The same court used much the same
reasoning in an accidental injury case,27 saying that in such event the
limitation period does not begin to run until "it becomes or should be-
come reasonably apparent to a workman that he has a compensable
disability." 28  The point is that the legislatures and courts have come
to recognize the inherently unknowable character of the occupational
disease in its earlier stages, and generally rather liberal claim periods
for that category of disability have been provided. 29 Even in many of
those jurisdictions where the limitation period on accidental injuries
dates from the time of the accident, there are to be found separate
provisions allowing claims for occupational disease to be filed within a
certain period after "disability," "first symptom," "diagnosis," "manifes-
tation," etc.30 For example, G.S. § 97-58 provides that claims for oc-
cupational disease may be filed within one year from "death, disability,
or disablement, as the case may be."31 The North Carolina Supreme
Court, in construing this section, has said that the legislature did
not intend to require employees suffering from compensable occupa-
24 Rathien v. Industrial Comm'n, 233 Wis. 452, 289 N.W. 618 (1940).
" Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter, 192 Md. 494, 64 A.2d 715 (1949).
"Id. at 506, 64 A.2d at 721.
'7 Gracie v. Koppers Co., 213 Md. 109, 130 A.2d 754 (1957).
"Id. at 114, 130 A.2d at 757.
See generally, 100 C.J.S., Workmen's Comzpenation § 468 (8)b (1958).
"Compare VA. CoDE ANN. § 65-84 (1950), requiring that a claim for an
accidental injury be filed with the Commission within one year after the accident,
with VA. CoDE ANN. § 65-49 (Supp. 1958), allowing a claim for occupational
disease to be filed within one year after the claimant experiences a distinct mani-
festation, or a diagnosis is made, whichever shall first occur, of an occupational
disease.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58 (a) (1958). The term "disability" is defined as an
incapacity to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of
the injury in the same or any other employment. G.S. § 97-2(i). The term
"disablement" as it is applied to cases of asbestosis and silicosis means the actual
incapacitation by either disease to earn the wages which the employee was
receiving "at the time of his last injurious exposure to asbestosis or silicosis, but
in all other cases of occupational disease 'disablement' shall be equivalent to
'disability'.. . ." G.S. § 97-54.
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tional disease to diagnose their own condition, or to file a claim for
compensation before they know they have such a disease or run the risk
of having their claim barred by the statute of limitations.3 2  The
operative factors in a claim for compensation based on an occupational
disease in North Carolina, therefore, are disability and an awareness
of the incidence of the particular disease. The employee suffering from
an occupational disease8 3 does not stand the risk of losing his right to
compensation until he knows or has reason to know that he actually
suffers from the disease. But the employee who sustains a latent or
progressive injury in an industrial accident, an injury as inherently
insidious in many instances as an occupational disease, stands to lose
forever his right to compensation unless the injury becomes apparent
within two years after the accident. It is submitted that notwithstanding
the factual distinction between occupational disease and accidental in-
jury in their inception, their development is essentially the same, and
the same legal principles should apply. For in either event no amount
of diligence on the part of the employee would avail until his condition
became manifest.
The purpose of a limitation period on filing claims for compensation
is the same as for any other statute of limitations: to protect the person
to be charged from stale or fraudulent claims that are too old or too
doubtful to be successfully investigated and defended.8 4 It has been
argued that if an employer is to be open to claims filed several years
after the occurrence of the accident the very purpose of the limitation
period will be defeated.35  The argument may be simply illustrated.
An employee is involved in an accident in the course of his employment
and experiences a slight twinge of pain in the back. But if there is
any serious injury he is completely unaware of it. Then months or
even years later while working around his house he lifts a heavy bag of
cement and "slips" a disc. The workman remembers the employment-
connected accident but no one else does. To answer the argument, it
may be pointed out that there are actually two distinct limitation periods
in most statutes8 0 with which the employee must comply: The first is
the period for giving -notice of the accident to the employer, and the
second is the period for filing claim with the particular agency or court
for compensation. G.S. § 97-22 requires that written notice of the
accident be given to the employer within thirty days after its occurrence,
" Huskins v. United Feldspar Corp., 241 N.C. 128, 84 S.E.2d 645 (1954);
Duncan v. Carpenter, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410 (1951).
" See N.C. GEx. STAT. § 97-53 (1958) where the compensable occupational
diseases are enumerated.
"Butler v. Bell, 181 N.C. 85, 106 S.E. 217 (1921); Harris v. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co., 200 La. 445, 8 So. 2d 289 (1942). See 1 Woon, LIMiTATIONS OF AcTioNs
§ 4 4th ed. 1916).
See 2 LARSEN, op. cit. supra note 13, § 78.42(b).
HoRovITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 247 (1944).
[Vol. 37
1959] NOTES AND COMMENTS 361
unless reasonable excuse for late notice is made to the satisfaction of
the Industrial Commission.37 The notice provision should certainly
give the employer sufficient protection with respect to investigating the
facts of the accident, minimizing the degree of the injury, and soliciting
the statements of witnesses. And furthermore the "doubtful claim"
argument has been satisfactorily met by Professor Larsen who points
out that in any event the claimant must still prove his case, including
the "arising out of" requirement and the exercise of due care in discover-
ing the nature of his disability.38 The ultimate question is whether the
procedural purposes to be served by the "accident" type statute are
so necessary as to justify their defeating a piece of purportedly protec-
tive and remedial legislation.
As the courts are too prone to apply the limitation provision under
an "accident" statute by its strict letter, the obvious remedy lies with
the legislature, although an occasional court will acknowledge that
"justice and fairness" speak for a contrary conclusion.3 9 However, at
least one court4" has assumed the task of carrying over into the adjective
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-22 (1958). The "reasonable excuse" provision permits
the excuse of waiver, or estoppel in not notifying the employer of the accident
within the prescribed time. Yet the North Carolina court speaks of the limita-
tion period for filing a claim for compensation as a condition precedent to the
substantive right to receive compensation, and asserts that it is not an "ordinary"
Statute of Limitations. Winslow v. Carolina Conference Ass'n, 211 N.C. 571,
191 S.E. 403 (1937). If that is true, there should be no question of waiver of the de-
fense of late filing, or estoppel to assert it, or even fraud in causing the late filing,
since the limitation period, if a condition precedent, would limit the liability and not
the rentedy, in which case it could not be construed on equitable considerations as
analogous to waiver and estoppel. Simons v. Halcomb, 98 Conn. 770, 120
Atl. 510 (1923). Notwithstanding the North Carolina courts assertion that
the limitation period is a condition precedent, and even jurisdictional to the
right of the Commission to hear a claim, Wray v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen
Mills Co., 205 N.C. 782, 172 S.E. 487 (1934), in other cases involving the claim
period question the court has stated that, "It must not be understood that we
hold an employer may not by his conduct w.aive the filing of a claim within the
time required by law. The law of estoppel applies in compensation proceedings as
in all other cases." Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777(1953). An allied problem, to which the same general principles of this comment
relate, is that of a recurrence of an injury or a change of condition. G.S. § 97-47
provides that the Commission may review an award and on such review make
an award ending, diminishing, or increasing the compensation previously awarded,
but no such review can be made after twelve months from the date of the last
payment of compensation. Medical or other treatment bills paid by the em-
ployer are treated as payments of compensation for the purposes of this section
only. It has no relation to the filing of original claims under G.S. § 97-24(a).
Payment of medical bills as allowed by G.S. § 97-25 (for the purpose of dimin-
ishing the severity of an injury) ivill not have the effect of an admission of liability
by the employer or constitute a waiver of the necessity of filing timely claim
with the Commission. Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., supra.
"s2 LAitSEx, op. cit. supra note 13, § 78.42(b).
" Bergstrom v. O'Brien Sheet Metal Co., 251 Minn. 32, 86 N.W.2d 82 (1957).
This was also recognized by Mr. Justice Denny in the Whitted case. "It may be
regretted that we have no provision in our Workmen's Compensation Act to
preserve and protect the rights of employees in cases like the one before us."
Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co., 228 N.C. 447 at 453, 46 S.E.2d 109 at 113 (1948).
"Keenan v. Consumers Public Power Dist., 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261
(1949).
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law of workmen's compensation the beneficent qualities of the substan-
tive, and has realized that the purposes of legislation involving a whole
new area of claims and liabilities cannot be effectuated by a rigid in-
terpretation of every word. The Nebraska court, faced with a latent
injury problem and a straight "accident" type statute, held that the
"literal limitation of the statute has no application where the injury is
latent and progressive and the employee is without knowledge of the
condition." 4 1  The court said that in such a case the action for com-
pensation could be brought within one year from the time the claimant
obtained knowledge of his condition.
An interpretation of a straight "accident" type statute as running
from the time the employee knew or ought to have known that he had a
compensable injury can be supported on various grounds. 42 In the first
place, it could hardly be presumed that the legislature intended to de-
feat the purpose of the act by setting up a virtually impossible claim
requirement in the case of latent injury, and certainly to the extent
that meritorious claims are not awarded the purpose of the act is
thwarted.48  Further, the claim period section should be construed in
such a way as to meet the typical coverage formula of "injury by
accident, arising out of and in the course of employment." 44  Since an
injury is certainly as important to the coverage formula as an accident,
the word "accident" in the claim period section could be construed as
meaning "accidental injury." Professor Larsen advocates this sensible
construction, pointing out that an "accidental injury" is the very heart
of the coverage formula.45  Finally, the constitutionality of legislation
that at once destroys common law rights for personal injuries sustained
during the course of employment and prevents the right to compensation
by a procedural road block such as an "accident" type limitation pro-
vision has been questioned,46 especially if in the particular jurisdiction
there exists a state constitutional provision, as in North Carolina, that
purports to assure a legal remedy for every injury.47  While the latter
"
1Id. at 57, 40 N.W.2d at 263.
42 See, e.g., Austin, Essay on Interpretation, in 2 JURISPRUDENCE 989 (5th ed.
1885). "Where a statute is remedial, and so entitled to a liberal construction,
judicial extensive interpretation has always been recognized as genuine interpreta-
tion." (Emphasis added.)
'
3 Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 80 N.H. 194, 115 Atl. 449 (1921).
"As to the coverage formula, see Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 53 S.E.2d
668 (1949). Cf. Griffitts v. Humphrey, 199 Tenn. 528, 288 S.W.2d 1 (1955),
expressly adopting the language of Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah
510, 74 P.2d 657 (1937) which is set out in the text at note 20 supra.
" 2 LARSEN, op. cit. supra note 13, § 78.42(d).
,6 Ibid.
" N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 35: "All courts shall be open; and every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law ... ." As to the enactment of statutes in other jurisdictions
abolishing civil actions for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction,
and breach of promise to marry, see, generally I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAws § 6 (1935). The constitutionality of such statutes generally has been
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argument has considerable merit, it overlooks the fact that workmen's
compensation is not predicated on negligence or any other historically
actionable wrong, but creates a whole new statutory area of claims and
liabilities that were non-existent at the common law. If it happened
that in any particular case the accidental injury was caused by the
negligence of the employer, denial of a remedy by way of the procedural
bar might well violate such a constitutional guaranty.
The North Carolina court will presumably adhere to its strict con-
struction policy, however, and if relief is to be had from the present
straight "accident" type statute the General Assembly will probably
have to provide it. The 1955 amendment, enlarging the claim period
from one to two years after the accident, would at least prevent the
harsh result of the Whitted case on its particular facts. But it is
respectfully submitted that the claim period provision should be amended
as follows:
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24(a).--"The right to compensation under
this article shall be barred unless a claim is filed with the Industrial
Commission within two years from the date the employee knew or
ought to have known the nature of his injury and its relation to the
employment. If death results from such injury, claim must be filed
with the Commission within one year after the death."
DONALD L. HARDISON
upheld on the ground that the marriage contract results in a special relation
created by the state, and thus subject to the state's control. Fearon v. Treanor,
272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E.2d 815 (1936), rehearing denied 273 N.Y. 528, 7 N.E.2d
677, appeal dismissed 301 U.S. 667, rehearing denied 302 U.S. 774 (1937).
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